In this paper, we describe new and improved attacks on the authentication scheme previously proposed by Yeung and Mintzer. Previous attacks assumed that the binary watermark logo inserted in an image for the purposes of authentication was known. Here we remove that assumption and show how the scheme is still vulnerable, even if the binary logo is not known but the attacker has access to multiple images that have been watermarked with the same secret key and contain the same (but unknown) logo. We present two attacks. The first attack infers the secret watermark insertion function and the binary logo, given multiple images authenticated with the same key and containing the same logo. We show that a very good approximation to the logo and watermark insertion function can be constructed using as few as two images. With color images, one needs many more images, nevertheless the attack is still feasible. The second attack we present, which we call the 'collage-attack' is a variation of the Holliman-Memon counterfeiting attack. The proposed variation does not require knowledge of the watermark logo and produces counterfeits of superior quality by means of a suitable dithering process that we develop.
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