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Is Investment-Cash Flow Sensitivity Caused by Financing Constraints or Agency Conflicts? Evidence from China

机译：是由融资约束还是代理冲突引起的投资现金流敏感性？来自中国的证据

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摘要

Based on a sample of Chinese listed companies, this paper explores the reasons for the relationship between cash flow and investment spending though examining the role of cash holdings on the investment-cash flow sensitivity. We find that the strong cash flow sensitivities of investment spending are indeed associated with companies’ financing constraints or overinvestment of managerial discretions. The results suggest that the private enterprises and the large-sized local SOEs are more likely to over-invest, and higher levels of cash holdings play significant entrenchment effects and exacerbate the overinvestment behaviors of these companies. The results also imply that the small and medium-sized SOEs are suffered from financing constraints and their cash holdings act as a hedging device and mitigate the extent of financing constraints.
机译：本文以中国上市公司为样本，通过考察现金持有量对投资现金流量敏感性的作用，探讨了现金流量与投资支出之间关系的原因。我们发现，投资支出对现金流量的强烈敏感性确实与公司的融资限制或管理层酌情决定权的过度投资有关。结果表明，民营企业和大型地方国有企业更有可能进行过度投资，现金持有量的增加会产生显着的盘根效应，并加剧这些公司的过度投资行为。结果还暗示，中小型国有企业受到融资限制，其现金持有量充当对冲工具，减轻了融资限制的程度。

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