• 主题
高级搜索  >
历史搜索 清空历史
首页> 外文会议>2007年战略管理国际会议 >Channel Coordination and Revenue Sharing with Price-Sensitive Demands
【24h】

Channel Coordination and Revenue Sharing with Price-Sensitive Demands

机译：具有价格敏感需求的渠道协调和收益共享

获取原文
页面导航
  • 摘要
  • 著录项
  • 相似文献
  • 相关主题

摘要

In this paper, we consider revenue sharing and franchise fees as coordination mechanisms in a supply chain system consisting of a supplier and a buyer with price-sensitive demand. The problem is analyzed as a Stackelberg Game in which the retailer acts as the leader by announcing his revenue share that he has chosen in advance, and the supplier acts as the follower by determining production retail price and thus delivery quantity for his product is determined. In such consignment relationship, the supplier retains ownership of the product. Making use of game theoretic analytical method, we compare the revenue sharing contract that the retailer gives to the supplier when they work jointly with that when they work independently. It is shown that revenue sharing is not sufficient to guarantee the system's profit maximization. By charging the retailer franchise fees to offset an amount equal to or more than his losses due to the decrease of his revenue share based on channel revenue maximization. It then shows that the mechanism of employing revenue sharing and franchise fees can achieve channel perfect coordination when demand is price-sensitive, meanwhile, the channel profits and individual profits achieved by employing revenue sharing and franchise fees are both larger than those achieved when they are decentralized decisions. Last, the numerical examples and simulation analysis are provided, which indicates the feasibility of the coordination mechanisms.
机译：在本文中，我们将收益分成和特许经营费视为由价格敏感需求的供应商和购买者组成的供应链系统中的协调机制。将问题作为Stackelberg游戏进行分析，在该游戏中，零售商通过宣布自己预先选择的收入份额来充当领导者，而供应商通过确定生产零售价来充当追随者，从而确定其产品的交付量。在这种托运关系中，供应商保留产品的所有权。利用博弈论的分析方法，我们比较了零售商与供应商共同工作时与供应商独立工作时给予供应商的收益分成合同。结果表明，收益共享不足以保证系统的利润最大化。通过向零售商收取特许经营费，以抵消等于或大于其损失的金额，这是基于渠道收入最大化而导致的收入份额减少所致。结果表明，当需求对价格敏感时，采用收益分成和特许权使用费的机制可以实现渠道的完美协调，同时，采用收益分成和特许权使用费所获得的渠道利润和个人利润都大于需求分配时获得的利润。分权决策。最后，通过算例和仿真分析，说明了协调机制的可行性。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱：kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备：11010802029741号 ICP备案号：京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有

  • 客服微信

  • 服务号