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Design on the Dynamic Monitor Contracts of Staged Financing in Venture Capital

机译:风险投资分阶段融资动态监控合约设计

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摘要

Due to the asymmetry of information,there are serious adverse selection and moral hazard problems between venture capitalist (VC) and venture entrepreneur (VE) in venture capital.So as to prevent their profits from invading,VC always chooses staged financing as a basic investment strategy.However,by practice investigating,it is proved that staged financing strategy can not gain expected effect unless designing guarantee contract.Therefore,combining the complexity and dynamic characteristic of staged financing and basing on the investment profits of VC,this thesis firstly design the whole management framework of dynamic monitor mechanism in staged financing.Further more,basing on the management framework,several idiographic monitor modules are designed,and a whole dynamic monitor model is formed by applying modularize theory.In conclusion,a thought of contract guarantee is proposed to make staged financing in venture capital go on wheels.
机译:由于信息的不对称性,风险投资中的风险投资家和风险企业家之间存在严重的逆向选择和道德风险问题。为了防止其利润被入侵,VC总是选择分阶段融资作为基本投资。然而,通过实践调查,证明了分阶段融资策略只有设计担保合同才能达到预期的效果。因此,结合分阶段融资的复杂性和动态性,并基于VC的投资收益,本文首先设计了分阶段融资策略。进一步,在分阶段融资的基础上,建立了动态​​监控机制的整个管理框架。进一步,基于该管理框架,设计了几个具体的监控模块,并运用模块化理论形成了一个完整的动态监控模型。使风险资本中的分阶段融资得以进行。

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