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Games of Setting Optimal Markdown Timing for Perishable Products

机译:为易腐产品设置最佳降价时机的游戏

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This paper deals with a kind of specific retailing that sells a fixed stock of perishable goods over a finite horizon. The competition between two retailers is taken into account. A Stackelberg game and a Cournot game are proposed respectively based on Gallego and van Ryzin’s two-price policy. With the help of illustrations, it can be found that the two-type game models have the same equilibrium points. Compared with the pricing policy without consideration of competition, the optimal markdown timing of the leading product will be delayed and that of the following product will be advanced. A numerical example is given and the effects of the customer transfer probability between suppliers on the equilibrium of the game are also analyzed. The models proposed in this paper are helpful for the competitive retailers to determine the markdown timing for their perishable products.
机译:本文涉及一种特定的零售,它在有限的范围内出售易腐商品的固定库存。考虑了两个零售商之间的竞争。分别根据加勒戈(Gallego)和范·雷津(van Ryzin)的两价政策,提出了Stackelberg游戏和Cournot游戏。借助说明,可以发现两种类型的博弈模型具有相同的平衡点。与不考虑竞争的定价政策相比,主导产品的最佳降价时机将被推迟,而后续产品的最优降价时机将被提前。给出了一个数值例子,并分析了供应商之间客户转移概率对博弈均衡的影响。本文提出的模型有助于竞争零售商确定其易腐产品降价的时机。

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