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Option Game on RD Investment Decision under Uncertainty: The Case of Labor-managed and Profit-maximizing Firms

机译:不确定条件下的R&D投资决策的期权博弈:以劳动力管理和利润最大化的公司为例

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Based on the uncertainty of market size and results of R&D, combining with characters of labor-managed firms, we develop a model of technology innovation in the duopoly market of labor-managed and profit-maximizing firm coexisting, and analysis the effects of some facts on option value of R&D investment in the labor-managed firm. Our results show that option value of R&D investment in the labor-managed firm is proportional to the raise of labor’s productivity, and inversely proportional to the maximal investment of successful R&D. However, option value of R&D investment in the labor-managed firm has uncertain relation to its own R&D investment and expectant market size, which is different from the results of profit-maximizing firms.
机译:基于市场规模的不确定性和R&D的结果,结合劳动力管理企业的特点,建立了劳动力管理企业与利润最大化企业共存的双头垄断市场的技术创新模型,并分析了一些事实的影响。劳动力管理公司的R&D投资的期权价值。我们的结果表明,在劳动力管理型企业中,R&D投资的期权价值与劳动生产率的提高成正比,与成功R&D的最大投资成反比。但是,这家劳资公司的研发投资的期权价值与其自身的研发投资和预期的市场规模没有确定的关系,这与利润最大化的公司的结果不同。

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