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首页> 外文会议>2010 3rd International Conference on Information Management, Innovation Management and Industrial Engineering >Study on the Coordination System of Supply-Chain with Loss-Averse Retailers Participation
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Study on the Coordination System of Supply-Chain with Loss-Averse Retailers Participation

机译：规避损失的零售商参与的供应链协调体系研究

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This thesis studies the best decision of Loss-averse retailers with regard to a buy-back contract, the result shows that retailers tend to make a decision that deviates from the best one within the system due to their fear of loss. But the supply-chain coordination under buy-back contract can be made through stimulation to retailers if the reward-punishment contract is introduced. In the end, this thesis proves effects of the reward-punishment contract in supply-chain coordination with numerical examples, and illustrates that the harder retailers try to avoid risks, the more suppliers have to pay for supply-chain coordination.
机译：本文研究了规避损失的零售商关于回购合同的最佳决策，结果表明，由于担心损失，零售商倾向于做出偏离系统内最佳决策的决策。但是，如果引入奖励惩罚合同，则可以通过刺激零售商来实现回购合同下的供应链协调。最后，通过算例验证了奖惩合同在供应链协调中的作用，并说明零售商越努力规避风险，供应商就必须付出更多的代价来进行供应链协调。

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