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首页> 外文会议>2011 IEEE International Symposium on Circuits and Systems >Can stubbornness or gullibility lead to faster consensus? A study of various strategies for reaching consensus in a model of the naming game
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Can stubbornness or gullibility lead to faster consensus? A study of various strategies for reaching consensus in a model of the naming game

机译：固执或轻信可以导致更快的共识吗？在命名游戏模型中达成共识的各种策略的研究

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The naming game is a dynamical system that is used to model and study language formation, in particular to determine how words are formed that are used by all members of a community to denote the same object or concept. We propose a model of the naming game that allows for theoretical investigation under various behavior for agent interaction. In particular, we give conditions on the network such that consensus is reached where at most p synonyms are used to describe a single object. In addition, we give lower bounds on the convergence rate to consensus. Furthermore, we study various agent interaction behaviors and their effect on the time needed to reach consensus. We show that even though a democratic strategy is in general the best strategy for reaching consensus, a stubborn or a gullible strategy can allow for faster word formation than a democratic strategy for certain connection topologies among the agents.
机译：命名游戏是一个动态系统，用于建模和研究语言形成，特别是确定社区的所有成员用来表示相同对象或概念的单词形成方式。我们提出了一种命名博弈模型，该模型允许对代理交互的各种行为进行理论研究。特别是，我们在网络上给出条件，以便达成共识，其中最多使用p个同义词来描述单个对象。另外，我们将收敛速度的下界赋予共识。此外，我们研究了各种代理交互行为及其对达成共识所需时间的影响。我们表明，尽管民主策略通常是达成共识的最佳策略，但对于代理之间的某些连接拓扑，固执或易变的策略可以比民主策略更快地形成单词。

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