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Game theory analysis on listed company's credit behavior

机译:上市公司信用行为的博弈分析

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摘要

The credit of the listed company has been a hot issue. In this paper, dynamic games of incomplete information was used to explain the credit problems of listed companies. Using the KMRW reputation model, draw the following conclusions: As to the high information costs investors, they tend to uncooperative with the listed company with the condition of certain constraints and enough times of repeated game, while for the low information on the cost of investors, listed companies choose to comply with commitments, investors continue to invest, it is a “perfect bayesian equilibrium.”
机译:上市公司的信誉一直是一个热门话题。本文采用信息不完全的动态博弈来解释上市公司的信用问题。使用KMRW声誉模型,得出以下结论:对于信息成本高的投资者,在某些约束条件和重复博弈的时间足够的情况下,他们倾向于与上市公司不合作,而对于投资者成本的信息则较低。 ,上市公司选择遵守承诺,投资者继续投资,这是“完美的贝叶斯均衡”。

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