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Game Analysis of Earnings Management Considered Managerial Risk Preferences

机译:考虑盈余管理偏好的盈余管理博弈分析

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This paper has built a pay off matrix of earnings management game between shareholders and managers, in which we analyzed the factors, including managerial risk preferences that impact the game, by solving the Bayesian Nash equilibrium. With the analysis, we provide some suggestions for corporate governance about earnings management.
机译:本文建立了股东与管理者之间收益管理博弈的回报矩阵,在其中我们通过解决贝叶斯纳什均衡分析了影响博弈的因素,包括管理风险偏好。通过分析,我们为公司管理的盈余管理提供了一些建议。

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