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首页> 外文会议>IEEE International Conference on Grey Systems and Intelligent Services >The optimal cost-sharing incentive model of main manufacturer-suppliers for complex equipment under grey information
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The optimal cost-sharing incentive model of main manufacturer-suppliers for complex equipment under grey information

机译：灰色信息下复杂设备主要制造商-供应商的最优成本分担激励模型

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Based on the uncertainty and grey level of suppliers' efforts, the paper put forward the incentive strategy of main manufacturer sharing the suppliers' efforts cost, and established the optimal cost-sharing model under grey effort level. The paper calculated Nash equilibrium and Stackelberg equilibrium under the above incentive model, and came to the optimal proportion, the optimal effort level and the optimal income of main manufacturer sharing the supplier' development cost. It analyzed that the cooperation status between the main manufacturer and suppliers shifts from Nash equilibrium to Stackelberg equilibrium, and effective cost-sharing incentive program can achieve profits to growth and the effort level of the main manufacturer and suppliers to improve, proving that cooperation between the main manufacturer and suppliers achieves the possibility of Pareto improvement.
机译：基于供应商努力的不确定性和灰度，提出了主要制造商分担供应商努力成本的激励策略，并建立了灰色努力水平下的最优成本分担模型。在上述激励模型下，计算了纳什均衡和斯塔克伯格均衡，得出了共享供应商开发成本的主要制造商的最优比例，最优努力水平和最优收益。它分析说，主要制造商和供应商之间的合作状态从纳什均衡转变为斯塔克尔伯格均衡，有效的成本分担激励计划可以实现利润增长，并且主要制造商和供应商的努力水平得到提高，证明了主要制造商和供应商之间的合作水平。主要制造商和供应商可以实现帕累托改进的可能性。

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