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Empirical Research on Effects of Degree of Government Intervention on MA Efficiency of Listed Company in China

机译：政府干预程度对我国上市公司并购效率影响的实证研究

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Government intervention in transition period is one of the critical influential factors of merger efficiency, and there is much less research in this field. This paper deeply analyzed the effect of government intervention on merger efficiency from the multidimensional perspectives of the executive level of government intervention, transferring of state-owned control right and changing of final controller. This research concluded as follows, resource distribution efficiency of merger market is on the steady increase, however, government intervention has negative effect on company merger & acquisition, and the difference in the intervention extent of the government on the company merger & acquisition leads to the difference in the merger efficiency. With the enforcement of government intervention from the central government to provincial, city and county governments, the merger efficiency is in turn in decrement. The merger efficiency of state-owned controlling right transferring market is not high due to the effect of government intervention, and the transferring performance of state-owned controlling right with the changing of final controller is relatively high.
机译：政府在过渡期的干预是合并效率的关键影响因素之一，这一领域的研究更少。本文深入分析了政府干预对政府干预执行级别的多维视角的影响，转让国有控制权和最终控制员的变化。这项研究的结论如下，并购市场的资源配置效率的稳步增长，但是，政府干预对企业并购，并在公司并购导致了在政府的干预程度的差别的负面影响合并效率的差异。随着政府干预中央政府向省，城市和县政府的执行，合并效率又递减。由于政府干预的影响，国有控股权转让市场的合并效率并不高，而政府干预的效果，与最终控制器的变化转移的国有控制权的绩效相对较高。

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