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Incentive-based coordination mechanism for backup renewable energy investment

机译：基于激励的备用可再生能源投资协调机制

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Due to the intermittency of wind power, wind power suppliers have high risks for not being able to deliver enough energy they committed to the energy market. Outsourcing backup power capacities from conventional suppliers is an option to reduce their energy shortage risks. However, unanimous agreement cannot always be reached since each party plays on their own. In this paper, we integrate game theory and stochastic optimization methods to develop a coordination framework for wind power and conventional energy suppliers to reach a bilateral contract. With the proposed framework, the conventional power supplier can optimally allocate its energy capacity by participating in energy market and backing up the wind power supplier's energy shortage. The wind energy supplier can take advantage of the backup capacity built by conventional supplier to mitigate the wind power intermittency risk. Implementation results on real cases are provided to illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed framework.
机译：由于风力发电的间歇性，风力发电供应商面临无法交付他们致力于能源市场的足够能源的高风险。从传统供应商外包备用电源容量是减少他们能源短缺风险的一种选择。但是，由于各方都在各自为政，所以不能总是达成一致的协议。在本文中，我们将博弈论和随机优化方法相结合，为风能和常规能源供应商达成双边协议建立了协调框架。通过提出的框架，传统的电力供应商可以通过参与能源市场并弥补风电供应商的能源短缺来优化分配其能源容量。风能供应商可以利用传统供应商建立的备用容量来减轻风电间歇性风险。提供了实际案例的执行结果，以说明所建议框架的有效性。

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