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Evolutionary game analysis for the strategic behavior in the provision of elderly care service

机译：提供养老服务中战略行为的进化博弈分析

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摘要

The paper develops an evolutionary game model to analyze the strategic behavior of government and private enterprise in the provision of elderly care service. Based on the replication dynamic system, the paper analyzes the evolutionary stability strategy of the two participants. Six scenarios are given and their evolution process and results are also analyzed. Numerical experiments are given to verify the influence of initial conditions and related parameters on the strategy selection of the private enterprise. The subsidy, fine, supervision cost, number of customers served by enterprise and other related factors will affect the strategic choice of the enterprise. Finally, policy recommendations are given to the government sector to promote the development of China’s elderly service industry.
机译：本文建立了一个演化博弈模型，以分析政府和私营企业在提供养老服务方面的战略行为。基于复制动态系统，本文分析了两个参与者的进化稳定性策略。给出了六个场景，并分析了它们的演变过程和结果。通过数值实验验证了初始条件和相关参数对民营企业战略选择的影响。补贴，罚款，监管费用，企业服务的客户数量等相关因素将影响企业的战略选择。最后，对政府部门提出了政策建议，以促进中国养老服务业的发展。

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