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Evolutionary Game Analysis on Safety Supervision and Regulation of Coal Mine

机译：煤矿安全监管的演化博弈分析

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Considering the limited rational behavior of coal-mine enterprises and regulatory authorities, this paper studies the game problems in coal-mine safety production based on evolutionary game theory. The game strategy of coal-mine enterprises is described as the degree of effort on security, furthermore, the probability of safe production in coal-mine enterprises is defined. By introducing the speculative behavior of coal-mine enterprises, an evolutionary game model among national supervisory authorities, local regulatory authorities, and coal mining enterprises was established. Analyzing the model and performing numerical experiments on the results, it was found that the costs that the local supervisory authorities pay to supervise coal-mine enterprises and the rewards given by the national supervisory authorities to the local supervisory authorities can affect the evolution process and even change the evolution stability point. The research conclusions could provide reference for related research on coal-mine safety supervision.
机译：本文考虑了煤矿企业企业和监管机构的合理行为有限，基于进化博弈论研究了煤矿安全生产中的游戏问题。煤矿企业的比赛策略被描述为安全的努力，此外，煤矿企业安全生产可能性。通过介绍煤矿企业的投机行为，建立了国家监管机构，当地监管机构和煤炭矿业企业的进化博弈模型。分析模型及对结果进行数值实验，发现当地监管机构向监督煤矿企业支付的成本和国家监管机构向当地监管机构提供的奖励可能会影响进化过程甚至改变进化稳定点。研究结论可以为煤矿安全监管相关研究提供参考。

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