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Differential Fault Analysis of Trivium

机译:差速器的差异故障分析

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摘要

Trivium is a hardware-oriented stream cipher designed in 2005 by de Canniere and Preneel for the European project eStream, and it has successfully passed the first and the second phase of this project. Its design has a simple and elegant structure. Although Trivium has attached a lot of interest, it remains unbroken. In this paper we present differential fault analysis of Trivium and propose two attacks on Trivium using fault injection. We suppose that an attacker can corrupt exactly one random bit of the inner state and that he can do this many times for the same inner state. This can be achieved e.g. in the CCA scenario. During experimental simulations, having inserted 43 faults at random positions, we were able to disclose the trivium inner state and afterwards the private key. As far as we know, this is the first time differential fault analysis is applied to a stream cipher based on shift register with non-linear feedback.
机译:Trivium是一个由De Canniere和Preneel为2005年设计的面向硬件的流密码,为欧洲项目Estream,它已成功通过了该项目的第一阶段和第二阶段。其设计具有简单而优雅的结构。虽然戏剧性有很多兴趣,但它仍然不间断。在本文中,我们呈现琐事的差异故障分析,并使用故障注射提出对薄膜的两次攻击。我们假设攻击者可以损坏内部状态的一个随机位,并且他可以多次为同一内部状态做这一点。这可以实现如此。在CCA情景中。在实验模拟期间,在随机位置插入43个故障,我们能够透露旨在展示私人密钥的薄膜内部状态。据我们所知,这是第一次基于具有非线性反馈的移位寄存器应用于流密码的差分故障分析。

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