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Tradable Performance-Based CO2 Emissions Standards: Walking on the Thin Ice

机译：基于可交易的绩效的二氧化碳排放标准：在薄冰上行走

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Climate policy, like climate change itself, is subject to debate. Partially due to the political deadlock in Washington, DC, US climate policy, historically, has been driven mainly by state or regional effort until the recently introduced fed-eral Clean Power Plan (CPP). Instead of a traditional mass-based standard, the US CPP stipulates a state-speciffc performance-based CO2 emission standard and delegates considerableexibility to the states in achieving the standard. Typically, there are two sets of policy tools available: a tradable performance-based and a mass-based permit program. We analyze these two related but distinct standards when they are subject to imperfect competition in the product and/or permit mar-kets. Depending on the scenarios under consideration, the resulting problem could be either a complementarity problem or a Stackelberg leader-follower game, which is implemented as a mathematical program with equilibrium constraints (MPEC). We overcome the nonconvexity of MPECs by reformulating them as mixed integer problems. We show that while the cross-subsidy inherent in the performance-based standard that might effectively reduce power prices, it could inate energy demand, thereby rendering permits scarce. When the leader in a Stackelberg formulation has a relatively clean endowment under the performance-based standard, its ability to manipulate the electricity market as well as to lower permit prices might worsen the market outcomes compared to its mass-based counterpart. On the other hand, when the leader has a relatively dirty endowment, the "cross-subsidy" could be the dominant force leading to a higher social welfare compared to the mass-based pro-gram. This paper contributes to the current policy debates in regulating emissions from the US power sector and highlights different incentives created by the mass-and performance-based standards.
机译：气候政策，如气候变化本身，受辩论。部分原因是华盛顿，直流，美国气候政策的政治僵局，历史上，由于州或区域努力，在最近引入了美联储清洁能力计划（CPP）之前，主要由国家或区域努力驱动。美国CPP而不是传统的基于群众的标准，并规定了基于国家/地区的基于绩效的二氧化碳排放标准，并代表了各国实现标准的代表性。通常，有两组可用的策略工具：基于可交易的性能和基于群众的许可计划。当他们受到产品的不完美竞争和/或允许Mar-Kets时，我们分析这两个相关但不同的标准。根据所考虑的场景，所产生的问题可以是互补问题或Stackelberg领导者游戏，其作为具有均衡限制的数学程序（MPEC）实现。我们通过将它们重新重新装入混合整数问题来克服MPEC的非凸实。我们表明，虽然在基于性能的标准中固有的交叉补贴可能有效降低电价，但它可能会纳入能源需求，从而呈现允许稀缺。当Stackelberg制定的领导者在基于性能的标准下具有相对清洁的捐赠时，与其群众的对应物相比，其操纵电力市场以及降低许可证价格的能力可能会使市场结果恶化。另一方面，当领导者有相对肮脏的禀赋时，与基于群众的亲克相比，“交叉补贴”可能是导致更高社会福利的主导力。本文有助于调节美国电力部门排放的现行政策辩论，并突出由大规模和基于绩效的标准产生的不同激励措施。

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