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首页> 外文会议>China International Conference in Finance >CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS: MUCH ADO ABOUT NOTHING? THE EVIDENCE BEHIND PRIVATE EQUITY INVESTMENT PERFORMANCE
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CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS: MUCH ADO ABOUT NOTHING? THE EVIDENCE BEHIND PRIVATE EQUITY INVESTMENT PERFORMANCE

机译：公司治理和独立董事：众多什么都没有？私募股权投资表现背后的证据

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Recourse to independent directors by private equity investors is not tied to performance increases. We draw this conclusion from analyzing a unique data set representative of the European context: all deals made by Italian closed-end funds from 1999 to 2003. Our study shows,in fact,that corporate governance does not impact the rate of return on a deal. Performance,instead,is driven by the characteristics of an initiative (exit-way,holding period and shareholding). Further,we find that independent directors are involved in deals requiring greater skills and knowhow. They tend to resign when performance is unsatisfactory. Moreover,these professionals improve deal performance if their commitment with the management company lasts throughout the deal and if there is a continual turnover of these directors.
机译：私募股权投资者诉诸独立董事并未与绩效增加无关。我们从分析了欧洲背景的独特数据集的结论：意大利封闭资金从1999年到2003年的所有交易。我们的研究表明，实际上，公司治理不会影响交易的回报率。相反，性能由倡议的特征（出门，持有期和股权）驱动。此外，我们发现独立董事涉及需要提高技能和知识的交易。当表现令人不满意时，它们倾向于辞职。此外，这些专业人员如果他们与管理公司的承诺持续整个交易，以及这些董事的持续营业额，这些专业人员会改善交易表现。

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