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Political Relation, Rent-seeking Environment and Financing Constraint of Private Enterprise

机译：政治关系，寻求租盘环境和私营企业融资限制

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摘要

FHP explains the existence of financing constraint from the perspective of information asymmetry. It is to be discussed that whether political relation reduces the information asymmetry between enterprises and financial institutions or through power rentseeking between executives and government officials, to influence the constraint of private enterprises. From rent-seeking perspective, this paper studies the mechanism between political relation and financing constraint by building game theory model,and with the sample of enterprises in regulated industries, creatively designs empirical method to verify the theoretical results. This paper believes that political relation reduces the financing constraint of private enterprise by rent-seeking mechanism. In non-market oriented resource allocation area,private enterprise in regulated industries could avoid financing constraint by rent-seeking no matter it has political relation. In market-oriented resource allocation area,political relation could reduce the cost of rent-seeking to make private enterprise to avoid financing constraint.
机译：FHP从信息不对称的角度解释了融资限制的存在。应讨论政治关系是否减少了企业和金融机构之间的信息不对称，或通过高管和政府官员之间的租金，影响民营企业的制约因素。从寻租角度来看，本文研究了博弈论模型的政治关系与融资限制的机制，并在受监管产业中企业的样本，创造性地设计了经验方法来验证理论结果。本文认为，政治关系通过寻求租金机制减少了私营企业的融资限制。在非市场导向资源配置领域，受监管行业的民营企业可以通过租金来避免融资限制，无论它都有政治关系。在以市场为导向的资源配置领域，政治关系可能会降低租赁成本，以避免融资限制。

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