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The Motivation and Restriction Mechanisms of Emission Trading in the Tai Lake Basin

机译：大湖盆地排放交易的动机及限制机制

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摘要

This paper offers a Government- Enterprise-Public cooperation mode of emission trading in the Tai Lake Basin based on the governing theory of the common pool resources. Then, the motivation and restriction mechanisms have been designed, that is, a water environmental regulation contract with the effect of incentive and constraint penalty is signed between the water environmental management institute and the enterprises. Further, a principal-agent model is developed, by which a set of results of the water environment regulation optimal contract is obtained. The effects of public participation and local government protection probability on the contract are analyzed. The results show that the increase of public participation could decrease the optimal fine amount, which will weaken the contradictions between the local government and the enterprises, and the decrease of the local government protection probability would reduce the regulatory frequency, correspondingly the supervision cost will be low.
机译：本文基于共同池资源的管理理论，提供了一家政府 - 企业公共合作型排放贸易模式。然后，设计了动机和限制机制，即水环境管理研究所和企业之间签署了激励和制约刑罚的水环境监管合同。此外，开发了主要代理模型，通过该模型获得了水环境调节最佳合同的一组结果。分析了公众参与和地方政府保护概率对合同的影响。结果表明，公众参与的增加可能会降低最佳的罚款，这将削弱当地政府与企业之间的矛盾，以及当地政府保护概率的减少将降低监管频率，相应监督成本将会降低监管频率低的。

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