【24h】

Just a Little Bit More

机译:只是有点儿

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摘要

We extend the FLUSH+RELOAD side-channel attack of Benger et al. to extract a significantly larger number of bits of information per observed signature when using OpenSSL. This means that by observing only 25 signatures, we can recover secret keys of the secp256k1 curve, used in the Bitcoin protocol, with a probability greater than 50 percent. This is an order of magnitude improvement over the previously best known result. The new method of attack exploits two points: Unlike previous partial disclosure attacks we utilize all information obtained and not just that in the least significant or most significant bits, this is enabled by a property of the "standard" curves choice of group order which enables extra bits of information to be extracted. Furthermore, whereas previous works require direct information on ephemeral key bits, our attack utilizes the indirect information from the wNAF double and add chain.
机译:我们扩展了Benger等人的灌起+重载侧频攻击。在使用OpenSSL时,在每个观察到的签名中提取大量信息。这意味着通过仅观察25个签名,我们可以恢复在比特币协议中使用的SECP256K1曲线的密钥,概率大于50%。这是先前最熟知的结果上的数量级改善的顺序。新的攻击方法利用了两点:与之前的部分披露攻击不同,我们利用所获得的所有信息,而不仅仅是在最低重大或最高的比特中,这是通过“标准”曲线选择的“标准”曲线选择的属性启用额外的信息要提取。此外,虽然以前的作品需要关于季节缩短键位的直接信息,但我们的攻击利用来自WNAF双倍和添加链的间接信息。

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