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With or Without Super Platforms? Analyzing Online Publishers' Strategies in the Game of Traffic

机译:有或没有超级平台?在交通游戏中分析在线出版商的策略

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Given the dominance of online platforms in attracting consumers and advertisers, online publishers are squeezed between declining traffic and advertising revenues from their website content. In turn, super platforms, the dominant content dissemination platforms, such as Google and Facebook, are monetizing online content at the expense of publishers by selling ad impressions in advertising auctions. In this work, we analyze publishers' possibilities of forming a coalition and show that, under a set of assumptions, the optimal strategy for publishers is cooperation against a super platform rather than posting content on the super platform. Not choosing to publish on a super platform can yield the whole coalition more traffic, enabling some individual publishers to recoup the lost traffic. We further show that if the coalition does not forbid diversification, most publishers choose both coalition and super platform.
机译:鉴于在吸引消费者和广告商中的在线平台的主导地位,在线出版商在其网站内容中的流量下降和广告收入之间被挤压。反过来,超级平台,谷歌和Facebook等主导内容传播平台,通过在广告拍卖中销售广告印象来为出版商的费用货币化在线内容。在这项工作中,我们分析出版商的形成联盟的可能性,并表明,在一系列假设下,出版商的最佳策略是对超级平台的合作,而不是超级平台上的内容。没有选择在超级平台上发布可以产生更多的联盟更多的流量,使一些单独的出版商能够收回丢失的流量。我们进一步表明,如果联盟不禁止多样化,大多数出版商都选择联盟和超级平台。

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