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Game model of safety investment in mines based on utility function

机译：基于实用功能的矿山安全投资游戏模型

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摘要

In order to reduce the costs and maximize the profit, many coal mining enterprises are gaming in the safety investment under the coal-mining supervision in China although relative supervision provisions are strict, which results in mine accidents happening. In order to make sense the causes that are behind the economic motivation, based on the gaming model with two variables, technology and cost, in utility function, a safety investment analysis for decision makers is conducted in this paper by focusing on the technological level and production cost in the coal mining enterprises and presenting the gaming process among these enterprises. The result is that there is no enough incentiveness in short term to conduct safety investment under the condition of low technological level in China. Therefore, it is necessary to enhance safety awareness, strengthen supervision and improve safety status of coal production.
机译：为了降低成本并最大限度地利用利润，许多煤矿企业在中国的煤炭矿业监管下的安全投资虽然相对监督规定严格，这导致矿业事故发生。为了意识到经济动机背后的原因，基于具有两个变量，技术和成本的游戏模型，在效用功能中，通过专注于技术水平，在本文中进行了决策者的安全投资分析煤矿企业生产成本并在这些企业中展示游戏过程。结果是，短期内没有足够的激励性，以便在中国的低技术水平条件下进行安全投资。因此，有必要提高安全意识，加强监督和提高煤炭生产安全状况。

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