首页> 外文会议>Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on electronic commerce. >The College Admissions Problem With a Continuum of Students
【24h】

The College Admissions Problem With a Continuum of Students

机译:连续学生的大学录取问题

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例

摘要

In many two-sided matching markets, agents on one side are matched to a large number of agents on the other side (e.g. college admissions). Yet little is known about the structure of stable matchings when there are many agents on one side. We propose a variation of the Gale and Shapley [3] college admissions model where a finite number of colleges is matched to a continuum of students. It is shown that, generically (though not always) (ⅰ) there is a unique stable matching, (ⅱ) this stable matching varies continuously with the underlying economy, and (ⅲ) it is the limit of the set of stable matchings of approximating large discrete economies.
机译:在许多双向匹配市场中,一侧的代理商与另一侧的大量代理商匹配(例如,大学录取)。当一侧有很多代理时,对稳定匹配的结构知之甚少。我们提出了Gale和Shapley [3]大学入学模型的一种变体,其中有限数量的大学与连续的学生相匹配。结果表明,一般而言(尽管并非总是)(ⅰ)存在唯一的稳定匹配,(ⅱ)此稳定匹配随基础经济而连续变化,并且(ⅲ)是近似的稳定匹配集的极限。大型离散经济体。

著录项

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱:kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备:11010802029741号 ICP备案号:京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有
  • 客服微信

  • 服务号