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首页> 外文会议>Proceedings of the 12th ACM conference on electronic commerce. >Money for Nothing: Exploiting Negative Externalities
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Money for Nothing: Exploiting Negative Externalities

机译：一无所有：利用负面的外部性

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摘要

We show that existence of negative externalities among market participants competing for a scarce resource, a setting typical for electronic commerce and internet advertising, allows for emergence of the no-allocation equilibrium with positive revenues for the seller. A monopolist selling A' indivisible items to a large number of unit-demand buyers who face negative externalities whenever their rivals get the items, can exploit these negative externalities. If the number of buyers is large enough, the no-allocation equilibrium emerges: no items get allocated, yet buyers still pay the seller to avoid a potential exposure to negative externalities. We provide conditions on the magnitude of externalities and on the level of buyer competition that yield optimality of the no-allocation equilibrium. In the context of internet advertising, the no-allocation equilibrium allows the monopolist seller of a limited number of ad slots to simultaneously (1) optimize revenues by collecting a small payment from each of the potential advertisers who are concerned with negative externality effects, and (2) ensure ad-free experience to its users. Therefore, our results describe settings in which ad-free user experience can be supported not just by charging users, but could be subsidized by potential advertisers whose ads will not be shown.
机译：我们证明，在竞争稀缺资源的市场参与者之间存在负外部性，这是电子商务和互联网广告的典型设置，它允许出现无分配均衡，并为卖方带来正收入。垄断者将A'不可分割的物品出售给大量的单位需求购买者，只要他们的竞争对手获得这些物品，他们就会面临负面的外部性，他们可以利用这些负面的外部性。如果购买者的数量足够多，就会出现无分配均衡：没有物品被分配，但是购买者仍然向卖方付款以避免潜在的负面外部影响。我们提供了关于外部性大小和买方竞争水平的条件，这些条件可以产生无分配均衡的最优状态。在互联网广告的背景下，无分配均衡使有限数量的广告位的垄断卖方可以同时（1）通过向与负面外部影响有关的每个潜在广告商收取少量付款来优化收入。 （2）确保为其用户提供无广告体验。因此，我们的结果描述了一些设置，在这些设置中，不但可以通过向用户收费来支持无广告的用户体验，还可以由可能不会展示广告的潜在广告客户提供补贴。

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