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Analysis on Credit Games and Countermeasures of Listed Companies

机译:上市公司信用博弈分析及对策

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摘要

The credit games of listed companies has become an important problem in economics. The paper analyzed the credit problems of listed companies by using the dynamic game with incomplete information, created a KMRW reputation model and came to some conclusions. Under certain constraints and repeated games, investors with high information costs came to converging on the noncooperation, when played games with listed companies. However, for investors with lower information cost, listed companies chose to honor their commitments and investors continued to invest, which was called “Perfect Bayesian equilibrium.”
机译:上市公司的信用博弈已成为经济学中的重要问题。利用信息不完全的动态博弈对上市公司的信用问题进行了分析,建立了KMRW声誉模型,并得出了一些结论。在一定的限制和反复的博弈下,与上市公司进行博弈时,信息成本高的投资者开始趋向于不合作。但是,对于信息成本较低的投资者,上市公司选择履行其承诺,而投资者继续进行投资,这被称为“完美的贝叶斯均衡”。

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