首页> 外文会议>Progress in Cryptology - INDOCRYPT 2006; Lecture Notes in Computer Science; 4329 >Efficient and Provably Secure Generic Construction of Three-Party Password-Based Authenticated Key Exchange Protocols
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Efficient and Provably Secure Generic Construction of Three-Party Password-Based Authenticated Key Exchange Protocols

机译:高效且可验证的三方基于密码的认证密钥交换协议的通用构造

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Three-party password-based authenticated key exchange (3-party PAKE) protocols make two communication parties establish a shared session key with the help of a trusted server, with which each of the two parties shares a predetermined password. Recently, with the first formal treatment for 3-party PAKE protocols addressed by Abdalla et al., the security of such protocols has received much attention from cryptographic protocol researchers. In this paper, we consider the security of 3-party PAKE protocols against undetectable on-line dictionary attacks which are serious and covert threats for the protocals. We examine two 3-party PAKE schemes proposed recently by Abdalla et al. and reveal their common weakness in resisting undetectable on-line dictionary attacks. With reviewing the formal model for 3-party PAKE protocols of Abdalla et al. and enhancing it by adding the authentication security notion for the treatment of undetectable attacks, we then present an efficient generic construction for 3-party PAKE protocols, and prove it enjoys both the semantic security and the authentication security.
机译:基于三方密码的认证密钥交换(3-party PAKE)协议使两个通信方在受信任的服务器的帮助下建立共享的会话密钥,两方均与之共享预定的密码。最近,随着Abdalla等人针对3方PAKE协议的首次正式处理,这种协议的安全性已受到密码协议研究人员的广泛关注。在本文中,我们考虑了三方PAKE协议的安全性,以防止无法检测到的在线字典攻击,这些攻击对协议而言是严重的隐性威胁。我们研究了Abdalla等人最近提出的两个三方PAKE方案。并揭示它们在抵御无法检测的在线字典攻击中的共同弱点。回顾了Abdalla等人的3方PAKE协议的正式模型。并通过添加用于处理不可检测的攻击的身份验证安全性概念对其进行增强,然后我们提出了一种高效的3方PAKE协议通用结构,并证明了它同时具有语义安全性和身份验证安全性。

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