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New Definition of Density on Knapsack Cryptosystems

机译:背包密码系统密度的新定义

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Many knapsack cryptosystems have been proposed but almost all the schemes are vulnerable to lattice attack because of its low density. To prevent the lattice attack, Chor and Rivest proposed a low weight knapsack scheme, which made the density higher than critical density. In Asiacrypt2005, Nguyen and Stern introduced pseudo-density and proved that if the pseudo-density is low enough (even if the usual density is not low enough), the knapsack scheme can be broken by a single call of SVP/CVP oracle. However, the usual density and the pseudo-density are not sufficient to measure the resistance to the lattice attack individually. In this paper, we first introduce a new notion of density D, which naturally unifies the previous two densities. Next, we derive conditions for our density so that a knapsack scheme is vulnerable to lattice attack. We obtain a critical bound of density which depends only on the ratio of the message length and its Hamming weight. Furthermore, we show that if D < 0.8677, the knapsack scheme is solved by lattice attack. Next, we show that the critical bound goes to 1 if the Hamming weight decreases, which means that it is quite difficult to construct a low weight knapsack scheme which is supported by an argument of density.
机译:已经提出了许多背包密码系统,但是几乎所有的方案由于其低密度而容易受到晶格攻击。为了防止晶格攻击,Chor和Rivest提出了一种轻量级背包方案,该方案使密度高于临界密度。在Asiacrypt2005中,Nguyen和Stern引入了伪密度,并证明了如果伪密度足够低(即使通常的密度不够低),也可以通过一次调用SVP / CVP oracle来破坏背包方案。但是,通常的密度和伪密度不足以单独测量对晶格侵蚀的抵抗力。在本文中,我们首先介绍了密度D的新概念,它自然地统一了前两个密度。接下来,我们得出密度的条件,以便背包方案容易受到晶格攻击。我们获得了密度的临界范围,该密度范围仅取决于消息长度与其汉明权重的比率。此外,我们表明,如果D <0.8677,则背包方案可通过晶格攻击解决。接下来,我们表明,如果汉明权重减小,则临界界限将变为1,这意味着构造密度参数支持的低权重背包方案非常困难。

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