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When Analysis Fails: Heuristic Mechanism Design via Self-correcting Procedures

机译:分析失败时:通过自我纠正程序进行启发式机制设计

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Computational mechanism design (CMD) seeks to understand how to design game forms that induce desirable outcomes in multi-agent systems despite private information, self-interest and limited computational resources. CMD finds application in many settings, in the public sector for wireless spectrum and airport landing rights, to Internet advertising, to expressive sourcing in the supply chain, to allocating computational resources. In meeting the demands for CMD in these rich domains, we often need to bridge from the theory of economic mechanism design to the practice of deployable, computational mechanisms. A compelling example of this need arises in dynamic combinatorial environments, where classic analytic approaches fail and heuristic, computational approaches are required. In this talk I outline the direction of self-correcting mechanisms, which dynamically modify decisions via "output ironing" to ensure truthfulness and provide a fully computational approach to mechanism design. For an application, I suggest heuristic mechanisms for dynamic auctions in which bids arrive over time and supply may also be uncertain.
机译:计算机制设计(CMD)旨在了解如何设计能够在多主体系统中引发理想结果的游戏形式,尽管存在私人信息,自身利益和有限的计算资源。 CMD在公共无线电频谱和机场着陆权的许多场合中都可以应用到Internet广告,供应链中的表达性采购,分配计算资源。为了满足这些丰富领域对CMD的需求,我们经常需要从经济机制设计理论到可部署的计算机制实践的桥梁。这种需求的一个令人信服的例子出现在动态组合环境中,在该环境中经典的分析方法失败了,并且需要启发式计算方法。在本演讲中,我概述了自我校正机制的方向,该机制通过“输出熨烫”来动态修改决策,以确保真实性并为机制设计提供完整的计算方法。对于一个应用程序,我建议进行动态拍卖的启发式机制,在这种机制中,投标随着时间的推移而到达,并且供应也可能不确定。

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