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首页> 外文会议>Symposium Series no.151; Symposium on Hazards XIX Process Safety and Environmental Protection; 20060328-30; Manchester(GB) >CONOCOPHILLIPS RESPONSE TO THE SATURATE GAS PLANT FIRE AND EXPLOSION INCIDENT
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CONOCOPHILLIPS RESPONSE TO THE SATURATE GAS PLANT FIRE AND EXPLOSION INCIDENT

机译：石油天然气厂火灾和爆炸事故的应对措施

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The ConocoPhillips Humber Refinery was first commissioned in 1969. Over subsequent years it has been expanded and its efficiency enhanced. One project was the addition of a Saturate Gas Plant (SGP), designed to improve the recovery of Liquefied Petroleum Gas (propane and butane) and gasolene (petrol components). The SGP was commissioned in 1980. The design included facilities to water wash the feed streams in order to remove inorganic salts which could ultimately cause corrosion and contamination of the products. Soon after commissioning additional water wash was installed in the overhead system, downstream of two main fractionator water draw streams. The additional water wash was designed to flush out soluble deposits which were causing a blockage in the overhead system, these deposits being mainly hydrates. It was not intended to reduce corrosion. These deposits were not totally unexpected. In April 2001 the 6" pipe between the de-ethaniser and the overhead condensers X452/3 failed downstream of the additional overhead system water wash, releasing highly flammable materials which ignited causing significant plant damage. Following the incident ConocoPhillips carried out a Root cause Analysis. The HSE investigation resulted in an Improvement Notice. These are described in the paper and focused on Piping Inspection (Root Based Inspection), Corrosion Management and Management of Change (MOC). ConocoPhillips believed that these actions were the start point. Additional longer term actions are also described in the paper. The Saturate Gas Plant was rebuilt to current design standards and the overheads system water injection was relocated between the two overheads heat exchangers. The paper describes the monitoring that was initiated and proposed long term plans. These additional steps are an essential part of the requirements to comply with Regulation 4 of COMAH. This being achieved by the implementation of a comprehensive Risk Based Inspection process that includes input from inspection, corrosion engineers and operating staff. This process starts at the initial review developing inspection plans, inspection results and a re-evaluation of the original review conclusions.
机译：康菲石油公司的Humber炼油厂于1969年首次投入使用。在随后的几年中，它进行了扩建，并提高了效率。一个项目是增加一个饱和气厂（SGP），该厂旨在提高液化石油气（丙烷和丁烷）和汽油（汽油成分）的回收率。 SGP于1980年投入运行。设计包括水洗进料流的设备，以去除可能最终导致产品腐蚀和污染的无机盐。调试后不久，在塔顶系统中的两个主分馏塔取水流下游安装了额外的水洗装置。额外的水洗旨在冲洗掉可溶解的沉积物，这些沉积物导致塔顶系统堵塞，这些沉积物主要是水合物。并不是要减少腐蚀。这些存款并非完全意外。 2001年4月，除乙烷器与塔顶冷凝器X452 / 3之间的6英寸管道在额外的塔顶系统水冲洗下游发生故障，释放出高度易燃的物质，点燃后会严重损坏工厂。事故发生后，康菲公司进行了根本原因分析。HSE调查产生了“改进通知”，在本文中进行了描述，并着重于管道检查（基于根的检查），腐蚀管理和变更管理（MOC）。康菲石油公司认为这些行动是起点，并且需要更长的时间本文还描述了相应的措施：饱和气厂已按照现行设计标准进行了改造，塔顶系统注水已在两个塔顶热交换器之间进行了重新布置；本文介绍了已启动的监控方案，并提出了长期计划。是遵守COMAH法规4的要求的重要组成部分。实施了全面的基于风险的检查流程，包括检查人员，腐蚀工程师和操作人员的意见。此过程从初始审核制定检查计划，检查结果以及对原始审核结论的重新评估开始。

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