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Simulation-Based Concurrent Non-malleable Commitments and Decommitments

机译：基于仿真的并发不可分割的承诺和退约

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摘要

In this paper we consider commitment schemes that are secure against concurrent man-in-the-middle (cMiM) attacks. Under such attacks, two possible notions of security for commitment schemes have been proposed in the literature: concurrent non-malleability with respect to commitment and concurrent non-malleability with respect to decom-mitment (i.e., opening).rnAfter the original notion of non-malleability introduced by [Dolev, Dwork and Naor STOC 91] that is based on the independence of the committed messages, a new and stronger simulation-based notion of non-malleability has been proposed with respect to openings or with respect to commitment [1,2,3,4] by requiring that for any man-in-the-middle adversary there is a stand-alone adversary that succeeds with the same probability. When commitment schemes are used as sub-protocols (which is often the case) the simulation-based notion is much more powerful and simplifies the task of proving the security of the larger protocols.rnThe main result of this paper is a commitment scheme that is simulation-based concurrent non-malleable with respect to both commitment and decommitment. This property protects against cMiM attacks mounted during both commitments and decommitments which is a crucial security requirement in several applications, as in some digital auctions, in which players have to perform both commitments and decommitments. Our scheme uses a constant number of rounds of interaction in the plain model and is the first scheme that enjoys all these properties under the simulation-based definitions.
机译：在本文中，我们考虑了可防止并发中间人（cMiM）攻击的安全承诺方案。在这种攻击下，文献中提出了承诺方案安全性的两种可能的概念：关于承诺的并发不可恶意和关于承诺（即开放）的并发不可恶意。 [Dolev，Dwork和Naor STOC 91]引入了基于可提交消息的独立性的-malleability，针对空缺或承诺[1]提出了一种新的更强大的基于仿真的非Malalability概念。 ,, 2,3,4]，要求任何中间人对手都有一个独立的对手，以相同的概率成功。当使用承诺方案作为子协议时（通常是这种情况），基于仿真的概念要强大得多，并且简化了证明较大协议的安全性的任务。基于模拟的并发不可否认的承诺和反承诺。此属性可防止在承诺和解除承诺期间安装的cMiM攻击，这在某些应用程序中是至关重要的安全要求，例如在某些数字拍卖中，玩家必须同时执行承诺和解除承诺。我们的方案在普通模型中使用了恒定的交互次数，并且是第一个在基于模拟的定义下享有所有这些属性的方案。

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  • 来源
    《Theory of cryptography》|2009年|91-108|共18页
  • 会议地点 San Francisco CA(US);San Francisco CA(US)
  • 作者

    Rafail Ostrovsky; Giuseppe Persiano; Ivan Visconti;

  • 作者单位

    Department of Computer Science and Department of Mathematics, UCLA, Los Angeles, CA 90095, USA;

    Dipartimento di Informatica ed Applicazioni, Universita di Salerno, 84084 Fisciano (SA), Italy;

    Dipartimento di Informatica ed Applicazioni, Universita di Salerno, 84084 Fisciano (SA), Italy;

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  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类 一般性问题;
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