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Universally Composable Multiparty Computation with Partially Isolated Parties

机译：具有部分隔离的各方的通用组合多方计算

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It is well known that universally composable multiparty computation cannot, in general, be achieved in the standard model without setup assumptions when the adversary can corrupt an arbitrary number of players. One way to get around this problem is by having a trusted third party generate some global setup such as a common reference string (CRS) or a public key infrastructure (PKI). The recent work of Katz shows that we may instead rely on physical assumptions, and in particular tamper-proof hardware tokens. In this paper, we consider a similar but strictly weaker physical assumption. We assume that a player (Alice) can partially isolate another player (Bob) for a brief portion of the computation and prevent Bob from communicating more than some limited number of bits with the environment. For example, isolation might be achieved by asking Bob to put his functionality on a tamper-proof hardware token and assuming that Alice can prevent this token from communicating to the outside world. Alternatively, Alice may interact with Bob directly but in a special office which she administers and where there are no high-bandwidth communication channels to the outside world. We show that, under standard cryptographic assumptions, such physical setup can be used to UC-realize any two party and multiparty computation in the presence of an active and adaptive adversary corrupting any number of players. We also consider an alternative scenario, in which there are some trusted third parties but no single such party is trusted by all of the players. This compromise allows us to significantly limit the use of the physical set-up and hence might be preferred in practice.
机译：众所周知，如果对手可能破坏任意数量的参与者，那么在没有设置假设的情况下，通常无法在标准模型中实现通用可组合的多方计算。解决此问题的一种方法是让受信任的第三方生成一些全局设置，例如公用参考字符串（CRS）或公钥基础结构（PKI）。 Katz的最新工作表明，我们可能会改用物理假设，尤其是防篡改的硬件令牌。在本文中，我们考虑了一个类似但严格较弱的物理假设。我们假设一个玩家（爱丽丝）可以部分隔离另一个玩家（鲍勃）来进行简短的计算，并阻止鲍勃与环境进行更多数量的限制的通信。例如，可以通过要求Bob将其功能放在防篡改的硬件令牌上并假设Alice可以阻止此令牌与外界进行通信来实现隔离。另外，爱丽丝可以直接与鲍勃互动，但可以在她所管理的特别办公室中进行，并且那里没有通往外界的高带宽通信渠道。我们表明，在标准密码学假设下，这种物理设置可用于在存在主动和自适应对手而破坏任何数量玩家的情况下，通过UC实现任何两方和多方计算。我们还考虑了一种替代方案，其中有一些受信任的第三方，但没有一个参与者受所有参与者的信任。这种折衷允许我们大大限制物理设置的使用，因此在实践中可能是首选。

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