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Proofs of Retrievability via Hardness Amplification

机译：通过硬度放大的可恢复性证明

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摘要

Proofs of Retrievability (PoR), introduced by Juels and Kaliski [JK07], allow the client to store a file F on an untrusted server, and later run an efficient audit protocol in which the server proves that it (still) possesses the client's data. Constructions of PoR schemes attempt to minimize the client and server storage, the communication complexity of an audit, and even the number of file-blocks accessed by the server during the audit. In this work, we identify several different variants of the problem (such as bounded-use vs. unbounded-use, knowledge-soundness vs. information-soundness), and giving nearly optimal PoR schemes for each of these variants. Our constructions either improve (and generalize) the prior PoR constructions, or give the first known PoR schemes with the required properties. In particular, wern1. Formally prove the security of an (optimized) variant of the bounded-use scheme of Juels and Kaliski [JK07], without making any simplifying assumptions on the behavior of the adversary.rn2. Build the first unbounded-use PoR scheme where the communication complexity is linear in the security parameter and which does not rely on Random Oracles, resolving an open question of Shacham and Waters [SW08].rn3. Build the first bounded-use scheme with information-theoretic security.rnThe main insight of our work comes from a simple connection between PoR schemes and the notion of hardness amplification, extensively studied in complexity theory. In particular, our improvements come from first abstracting a purely information-theoretic notion of PoR codes, and then building nearly optimal PoR codes using state-of-the-art tools from coding and complexity theory.
机译：Juels和Kaliski [JK07]引入的可恢复性证明（PoR）允许客户端将文件F存储在不受信任的服务器上，并随后运行有效的审核协议，在该协议中，服务器证明（仍然）拥有客户端的数据。 PoR方案的构建试图最小化客户端和服务器的存储，审核的通信复杂性，甚至是审核期间服务器访问的文件块的数量。在这项工作中，我们确定了问题的几种不同变体（例如，有限使用与无限制使用，知识健全与信息健全），并为每种变体提供了近乎最佳的PoR方案。我们的构造要么改进（并推广）现有的PoR构造，要么给出具有所需属性的第一个已知PoR方案。特别是wern1。正式证明Juels和Kaliski [JK07]有界使用方案的（优化）变体的安全性，而无需对对手的行为进行任何简化的假设。建立第一个无限制使用的PoR方案，该方案的通信复杂度在安全性参数中是线性的，并且不依赖于随机Oracle，从而解决了Shacham和Waters [SW08] .rn3的公开问题。建立具有信息理论安全性的第一个有界使用方案。rn我们工作的主要见解来自于PoR方案与硬度放大概念之间的简单联系，在复杂性理论中进行了广泛研究。特别地，我们的改进来自于首先抽象一个纯粹的信息理论上的PoR代码概念，然后使用来自编码和复杂性理论的最新工具构建几乎最佳的PoR代码。

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  • 来源
    《Theory of cryptography》|2009年|109-127|共19页
  • 会议地点 San Francisco CA(US);San Francisco CA(US)
  • 作者

    Yevgeniy Dodis; Salil Vadhan; Daniel Wichs;

  • 作者单位

    Department of Computer Science, New York University;

    Harvard School of Engineering Applied Sciences and Center for Research on Computation and Society, Cambridge, MA;

    Department of Computer Science, New York University;

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  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类 一般性问题;
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