声明
摘要
ABSTRACT
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Chapter 1 Introduction
Chapter 2 Theory and Institutional Background
Chapter 3 Literature Review
3．1 Definitions of Corporate Governance
3．2 Internal Governance Structures
3．3 Corporate Governance in China
3．4Corporate Board Structure
3．5 Research on Executive's Compensation
3．6 Executive’s Compensation in China
Chapter 4 Hypothesis Development
4．1 Theories and Hypothesis Development
Chapter 5 Data and Methodology
5．1 Variable’s Explanations
5．1．1 Dependent Variables
5．1．2 Main Independent Variables
5．1．3 Control Variables
Chapter 6 Empirical Results
6．1 Descriptive Statistics
6．2 Correlations Matrix of the Variables
6．3 Regressions Results:Relationship between Board Structure and Top Three Executive's Compensation
6．4 Regressions Results:Relationship between Firm Performance and Top Three Executives Compensation
6．5 Regressions Results:Relationship between Firm Performance．Board Structure and Top Three Executive's Compensation
6．6 Flrm Performance and Top Three Executives Compensation (Fixed Effects)
6．7 Board Structure and Top Three Executives Compensation (Fixed Effects)
6．8 Firm Performance,Board Structure and Top Three Executives Compensation (Fixed Effects)
6．9 Firm Performance and Top Three Executives Compensation (Random Effects)
6．10 Board Structure and Top Three Executives Compensation (Random Effects)
6．11 Firm Performance，Board Structure,and Top Three Executives Compensation (Random Effects)
6．12 Hausman Test:Choosing Between Fixed Effects or Random Effects
6．14 Dynamic Panel Data Estimates
6．15 Endogeneity Problem
6．16 CEO Pay Regressions Analysis
6．17 Robustness Testing
Chapter 7 Discussions and Conclusions
7．1 Discussions and Conclusions
7．2 Theoretical Contributions
7．3 Limitations and Future Research Directions
Refefences
APPENDIX
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Personal Resume，Academic Papers Published at School and Research Results
