Monitoring CEOs for Performance and Policies:The Case for CEO Turnover in China

声明

Acknowledgements

Abstract

Table of Contents

List of Tables

List of Figures

List of Abbreviations

Chapter Ⅰ：Introduction

1．1．Research Background

1．2．Research Objectives

1．3．Summary of the Research Findings

1．3．1．CEO Turnover and Monitoring for Performance

1．3．2．CEO Turnover and Monitoring for Policy Choices

1．4．Research Methods

1．5．Contributions of the Study

1．6．Outline of the Thesis

Chapter Ⅱ．Literature Review

2．1．Reason for CEO Turnover

2．1．1．Firm Performance

2．1．2．Ownership Structure

2．1．3．Firm Leverage

2．1．4．Firm Size

2．1．5．Board Composition

2．1．6．Board Size

2．1．7．CEO Characteristics

2．2．Changes in CEO Turnover Overtime

2．3．CEO Turnover in Chinese Firms

2．4．Monitoring of CEOs for Policy Choices

2．5．Gaps in Previous Research

Chapter Ⅲ：Hypotheses and Data Description

3．1．Hypotheses Development

3．1．1．Turnover-Performance Relationship and Reforms

3．1．2．Turnover and Peer Performance

3．1．3．Monitoring CEOS for Policy Choices

3．2．Data Sources

3．3．Variable Construction

3．3．1．CEO in Chinese Firm

3．3．2．Classification of the Reason for the CEO Turnover

3．3．3．Identification of Matching Firms

Chapter Ⅳ：Empirical Analysis

4．1．Trends in CEO Turnover in China

4．2．Tumover-Performance Relationship and Reforms

4．2．1．Non-Linear Regression Analysis

4．2．2．Graphical Analysis

4．2．3．Post-Turnover Performance

4．3．Turnover and Peer Performance

4．4．Monitoring CEOs for Policies Choices

4．5．Robustness Tests

4．5．1．Alternate Definitions of the CEO

4．5．2．Alternate Definition of the Retums

Chapter Ⅴ：Conclusion

5．1．Main findings

5．2．Implications for the Policy

5．3．Limitations of the Study

5．4．Suggestions for Future Research

References

Appendix