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Voluntary Internal Control Weakness Disclosures in Initial Public Offerings: Determinants and Subsequent Financial Reporting Quality.

机译：首次公开募股中的自愿内部控制弱点披露：决定因素和后续财务报告质量。

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摘要

This study examines registrants' incentives to disclose internal control weaknesses (ICWs) voluntarily in IPO registration statements and their post-IPO financial reporting quality. Using a sample of initial public offering (IPO) registrants from 2005-2013, I find that increasing management's disclosure credibility, by hiring a new CEO in the IPO, is an incentive to include ICWs in IPO registration statements. I find that management does build credibility with underwriters evidenced by IPO registrants that disclose ICWs voluntarily are associated with higher IPO offer prices. The results suggest that registrants including voluntary ICW disclosures are more likely to receive an adverse SOX 404 auditor opinion. I find that registrants' voluntary ICW disclosures are informative and are associated with negative cumulative abnormal returns only when an auditor issues an adverse SOX 404 auditor opinion after the disclosure. IPO registrants that voluntarily disclose ICWs and receive unqualified SOX 404 auditor opinions appear to be successful in mitigating negative cumulative abnormal returns. My findings provide evidence that misstatements appear to outpace material weakness disclosures for the sample of IPO registrants. Overall, the findings suggest that managers seek to build credibility through voluntary disclosure of ICWs at the IPO, allowing managers to maximize the rewards at the IPO date (i.e., IPO offer price). However, managers suffer punishment from investors if subsequent events (i.e., SOX 404 material weaknesses) call into question the credibility of the disclosure. The post-IPO financial reporting quality results are timely and relevant to regulators because the relationship between misstatements and unqualified audit opinions is puzzling. Additionally, the JOBS Act allows IPO registrants to delay SOX 404 compliance for up to five years. Finally, this study's results are important to investors because the purpose of SOX 404 is to provide an advanced warning of financial reporting weaknesses.
机译：本研究研究了注册人自愿披露IPO注册声明中的内部控制弱点（ICW）的动机及其IPO后财务报告质量。通过使用2005年至2013年的首次公开募股（IPO）注册者样本，我发现通过在IPO中雇用新的首席执行官来提高管理层的披露公信力，是将ICW纳入IPO注册声明的动机。我发现，管理层确实在承销商中树立了信誉，而首次公开招股的注册人证明自愿披露ICW与更高的IPO发行价有关。结果表明，包括自愿ICW披露在内的注册人更有可能收到不利的SOX 404审计意见。我发现注册人的自愿ICW披露是有益的，并且仅在审计师在披露后发布不利的SOX 404审计师意见时才与负累积异常收益相关联。自愿公开ICW并获得不合格的SOX 404审核员意见的IPO注册人似乎可以成功减轻负面累积的异常回报。我的发现提供了证据，表明对IPO注册人样本的虚假陈述要优于实质性弱点披露。总体而言，调查结果表明，管理人员试图通过在首次公开募股时自愿披露ICW来建立信誉，从而使管理人员能够在IPO日期（即IPO发行价）获得最大的回报。但是，如果随后发生的事件（即SOX 404的实质性弱点）使披露的可信度受到质疑，管理人员将受到投资者的惩罚。首次公开募股后的财务报告质量结果是及时的，并且与监管机构相关，因为错误陈述和不合格的审计意见之间的关系令人困惑。此外，《 JOBS法》允许IPO注册人将SOX 404合规性延迟最多五年。最后，这项研究的结果对投资者很重要，因为SOX 404的目的是对财务报告的弱点提供高级警告。

著录项

  • 作者

    Westfall, Tiffany Jo.;

  • 作者单位

    The University of Nebraska - Lincoln.;

  • 授予单位 The University of Nebraska - Lincoln.;
  • 学科 Accounting.;Finance.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2016
  • 页码 123 p.
  • 总页数 123
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

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