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Incomplete contracts and corporate governance: Theory and evidence---case studies on Chinese banking and U.S. franchising.

机译：不完整的合同和公司治理：理论和证据-有关中国银行业和美国特许经营的案例研究。

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摘要

This thesis applies the incomplete contract approach to studying the corporate governance in two cases: Chinese banking and U.S. franchising, both of which are issues of great significance from either academic or industrial perspective, but researches on them are still far from enough.;First, a wave of centralizing control rights has been widely observed in Chinese banking recently. Based on a two-state incomplete contract model, we show that it's actually a reaction to the following four facts---the opening up of the banking market, the reform of going public, the increasing serious financial frauds and the persistent high ratio of non-performing loans---which happen almost at the same time.;Second, the mixed governance structure as well as the uniform and time-invariant linear contract in franchising also confuses many economists. This thesis establishes a two-period double-sided moral hazard model to study the dynamic decision making on governance structure and contracting of a franchise chain. Our results suggest that both resource scarcity theory and agency theory work but carry different weights in different stages along the whole life. Moreover, the accumulation of branding value brings helps remove the diversification of contracting across outlets as well as phases in the long run.;Following this logic, we conduct an empirical analysis on the strategic interactions among franchise chains. Using data of 351 U.S. franchise chains from 43 sectors in 2005, we find significant evidence for spatial effects among franchise chains. Specifically, the coexistence of the complementary strategy in governance structure and the substituting strategy in contracting is consistent with the observed competition behavior and duopoly industrial structure in franchising.
机译：本文将不完全契约法应用于两种情况下的公司治理研究：中国银行业和美国特许经营，无论从学术角度还是从产业角度来看，这两个方面都是非常重要的问题，但是对它们的研究还远远不够。最近，在中国银行业普遍出现了集中控制权的浪潮。基于两个国家的不完全合同模型，我们表明这实际上是对以下四个事实的反应：银行市场的开放，上市改革，日益严重的金融欺诈行为和持续高比率第二，混合式的治理结构以及特许经营中的统一和时变线性合同也使许多经济学家感到困惑。本文建立了一个两阶段的双向道德风险模型，研究了特许经营链治理结构和契约的动态决策。我们的结果表明，资源稀缺理论和代理理论都起作用，但是在整个生命的不同阶段都具有不同的权重。此外，从长远来看，品牌价值的积累带来的好处有助于消除跨网点承包和阶段承包的多样化。根据这种逻辑，我们对特许经营链之间的战略互动进行了实证分析。使用2005年来自43个行业的351个美国连锁店的数据，我们发现了连锁店之间空间效应的重要证据。具体而言，治理结构中互补策略和合同替代策略的共存与特许经营中观察到的竞争行为和双头垄断产业结构是一致的。

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  • 作者

    Chen, Shaoling.;

  • 作者单位

    Hong Kong University of Science and Technology (Hong Kong).;

  • 授予单位 Hong Kong University of Science and Technology (Hong Kong).;
  • 学科 Economics Finance.;Economics Theory.;Business Administration Banking.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2007
  • 页码 255 p.
  • 总页数 255
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类 财政、金融;金融、银行;经济学;
  • 关键词

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