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首页> 外文学位 >Essays on international trade and political economy: The importance of incentives, information and globalization.
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Essays on international trade and political economy: The importance of incentives, information and globalization.

机译：关于国际贸易和政治经济学的论文：激励，信息和全球化的重要性。

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Chapter 1. This paper examines host governments' motivations for restricting ownership shares of multinational firms (MNFs) in foreign direct investment (FDI) projects. A host country has a profitable investment opportunity. The host government wants to capture the project's rent yet cannot observe the surplus created by the MNF. In contrast, a joint venture (JV) partner can observe the surplus. The host government can alleviate its informational constraints by using ownership restrictions to force a JV. This calls into question the wisdom of calls for 'liberalizing' FDI flows by the elimination of domestic JV requirements.; Chapter 2. We study the effect of globalization on the wage volatility and worker welfare in a model in which risk is allocated through long-run employment relationships. Globalization can take two forms: international integration of commodity markets and international integration of factor markets. We show that free trade and outsourcing have opposite effects on rich-country workers. Free trade hurts rich-country workers, while reducing the volatility of their wages; by contrast, outsourcing benefits them, while raising the volatility of their wages. We thus formalize, but also sharply circumscribe, a common critique of globalization.; Chapter 3. This paper analyzes an informational theory of lobbying in the context of strategic trade policy. A home firm competes with a foreign firm to export to a third country. The home policymaker aims to improve the home firm's profit by using an export subsidy. The optimal subsidy depends on the strength of the demand which is unknown to the policymaker. The home firm is given a chance to lobby the policymaker. Surprisingly, the presence of lobbying costs can be advantageous for both: It makes the home firm's lobby effort a costly signal that can reveal its private information and eases the policymaker's information problem.; Chapter 4. Economists' models of trade-policy determination generally assume unitary government. We offer a congressional model. Under assumptions guaranteeing a median-voter outcome under a unitary model, we find a wide range of possible outcomes: Any policy from the 25th to the 75th percentile voter's optimum can emerge in equilibrium. We discuss implications for empirical work.
机译：第1章。本文研究了东道国政府在外国直接投资（FDI）项目中限制跨国公司（MNFs）所有权的动机。东道国拥有有利可图的投资机会。东道国政府想扣留项目的租金，却无法观察到多国银行所产生的盈余。相比之下，合资伙伴可以观察到盈余。东道国政府可以通过所有权限制强制成立合资企业，从而减轻其信息约束。这使人们质疑通过取消国内合资企业要求来“自由化”外国直接投资流量的智慧。第2章。在通过长期雇佣关系分配风险的模型中，我们研究了全球化对工资波动和工人福利的影响。全球化可以采取两种形式：商品市场的国际一体化和要素市场的国际一体化。我们证明，自由贸易和外包对富国工人有相反的影响。自由贸易伤害了富国工人，同时减少了他们工资的波动；相反，外包使他们受益，同时增加了他们工资的波动性。因此，我们将对全球化的共同批判形式化，但也进行了明确的界定。第三章。本文分析了战略贸易政策背景下的游说信息理论。本地公司与外国公司竞争，以出口到第三国。房屋政策制定者旨在通过使用出口补贴来提高房屋公司的利润。最佳补贴取决于决策者不知道的需求强度。本地公司有机会游说决策者。出乎意料的是，游说费用的存在对两者都有利。这使得房屋公司的游说努力成为一个昂贵的信号，可以泄露其私人信息并减轻政策制定者的信息问题。第4章。经济学家的贸易政策确定模型通常采用统一政府。我们提供国会模型。在保证单一模式下的中位数投票结果的假设下，我们发现了各种各样的可能结果：从第25个百分点到第75个百分点的选民的最优政策可以均衡出现。我们讨论对实证工作的影响。

著录项

  • 作者

    Karabay, Bilgehan.;

  • 作者单位

    University of Virginia.;

  • 授予单位 University of Virginia.;
  • 学科 Economics Commerce-Business.; Economics Theory.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2006
  • 页码 189 p.
  • 总页数 189
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类 贸易经济;经济学;
  • 关键词

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