Why do terrorists select the targets that they do? Why do terrorist organizations often eschew simple targets for symbolic ones? And, why in other circumstances, do terrorists avoid symbolism for easy targets? Current explanations only provide a partial account. This project argues that targeting choices are driven by two competing needs for terrorist organizations: public support and operational success. The relative importance of each of these factors then determines what type of target a terrorist organization is more likely to select, either civilian or non-civilian.;Following previous literatures, I theorize that terrorist organizations are locked in bargaining interactions with targeted governments for public support. Governments need the assent of the public to govern while terrorist organizations need public support for their continued existence. I then condition this model by considering the role of three factors that can influence this interaction: government attributes, public support, and the presence of competing terrorist organizations. I posit that each has an independent effect on targeting, determining which target types a terrorist organization selects. In particular, attributes such as democracy, high levels of public support for terrorism, and a monopolistic group environment are likely to yield greater levels of civilian targeting. In addition, these factors should also have a joint effect; states with favorable values for all factors should be more likely to experience domestic terrorism than states with two or less of these attributes.;This theory is tested using a dataset of domestic terrorism for all states from 1970 to 2007. Empirical results are mixed. State attributes, such as democracy and openness, have no effect in increasing the likelihood that civilian targets are struck. On the other hand, public support as proxied by economic performance and repression, has a statistically significant effect in increasing the likelihood of terrorist violence against civilian targets. Lastly, organizational competition has a mixed effect; competition has no effect when measured independent and increases civilian targeting when measured in conjunction with public support.;I conclude the analysis by detailing the strengths and weaknesses of the approach, future areas of research, and specific policy recommendations to counter the terrorist targeting threat.
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