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The political economy of European Union competition policy: A case study of the telecommunications industry.

机译：欧盟竞争政策的政治经济学：以电信业为例。

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摘要

In the European Union (EU), competition policy is the first truly supranational public policy regulating market competition. It occupies a central place amongst other EU public policies. One of the stated objectives of EU competition policy is to prevent excessive concentration of economic power in the hands of a few. This dissertation investigates the political economy of EU competition policy by taking the European telecommunications industry as a case study. The main thesis is that EU competition policy has failed to achieve one of its objectives of preventing excessive market concentration in the telecommunications industry over the past quarter-century, for two reasons. First, EU competition policy foremost promotes an industrial policy that fosters the profitability of European firms. Second, EU competition policy is short of adequate theoretical and conceptual capacities to comprehend the working dynamics of market competition and the market behavior of firms, due to the contradictory foundations of the model of effective competition that EU institutions strive to achieve. Thus, EU competition policy objectives and its policy framework are not in line with possible efforts that might control monopolization. The dissertation takes the often-ignored concept of 'workable' or 'effective' competition as a starting point and investigates the phenomenon of market concentration with the aid of a theory of dynamic market competition (DMC). A detailed study of the European telecommunications industry between 1980 and 2004 is conducted to demonstrate EU competition policy's capacity to deal with market concentration as well as its broader public policy implications.
机译：在欧盟（EU）中，竞争政策是第一个真正的规范市场竞争的超国家公共政策。它在其他欧盟公共政策中占据中心位置。欧盟竞争政策的既定目标之一是防止少数人手中过度集中经济力量。本文以欧洲电信业为案例，研究了欧盟竞争政策的政治经济学。主要论点是，在过去的25个世纪中，欧盟竞争政策未能实现防止其在电信行业过度集中市场的目标之一，这有两个原因。首先，欧盟竞争政策最重要的是促进一项工业政策，从而提高欧洲公司的盈利能力。其次，由于欧盟机构努力实现的有效竞争模型的矛盾基础，欧盟竞争政策缺乏足够的理论和概念能力来理解市场竞争的工作动态和企业的市场行为。因此，欧盟竞争政策目标及其政策框架与控制垄断的可能努力不符。本文以经常被忽略的“可行的”或“有效的”竞争概念为出发点，并借助动态市场竞争理论（DMC）研究了市场集中现象。对1980年至2004年之间的欧洲电信行业进行了详细研究，以证明欧盟竞争政策应对市场集中的能力及其对公共政策的广泛影响。

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  • 作者

    Baskoy, Tuna.;

  • 作者单位

    York University (Canada).;

  • 授予单位 York University (Canada).;
  • 学科 Political Science General.; Political Science International Law and Relations.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2006
  • 页码 434 p.
  • 总页数 434
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类 政治理论;国际法;
  • 关键词

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