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Quantifying corporate governance: Executive employee compensation and independence of directors as a measure of the quality of corporate governance.

机译：量化公司治理：执行人员薪酬和董事的独立性是衡量公司治理质量的指标。

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摘要

This paper considers the subject of corporate governance observed through the prism of the relationship between executive compensation relative to their performance and interaction with the Board of Directors. The corporations researched belong to the special Information and Communication Technology (ICT) classification by the North American Industry Classification System.;The review of literature investigates legal and conceptual aspects of American corporations. Starting with the agency problem, the complexities of paying executives for their performance rather than their stature are examined. The question that CEOs and the Board of Directors bargain at arm's length when setting the CEOs compensation is challenged. Independence of directors, interlocked and interconnected boards, and entrenched boards structures are shown to likely give the CEO more bargaining power than the board, which increases their relative compensation as compared to an optimal arm's length bargaining process.;Recent compensation figures are presented to illustrate the recent public outrage over seemingly excessive CEO compensation. Modalities of hiding considerable amounts of compensation from the public eye are analyzed, followed by the different modalities of constructing compensation contract to motivate CEOs to perform in the interest of the corporation.;The body of research consists of multiple regression analysis relating four common measures of corporate return to CEO compensation as dependent variable. There are two research hypotheses stated: (1) excessive CEO pay results in poor corporate performance; and (2) weak boards result in higher CEO pay. The research finds that CEO pay variation has the strongest dependency on market capitalization, followed far behind by a firm's Return on Equity and Return on Assets. A much stronger positive relationship between Return on Equity and CEO pay is found when firms experience positive Return on Equity. The other measure of corporate return, Total Return to Shareholders, is found to have a mostly insignificant influence over compensation. The research also finds that CEOs who are also Chairman of the Board are not likely to receive higher compensation unless the firm experiences positive Return on Equities. A measure of 'excessive' CEO pay is recommended for future research using this paper's findings.
机译：本文通过高管薪酬与其绩效之间的关系以及与董事会的互动关系来考察公司治理的主题。所研究的公司属于北美行业分类系统的特殊信息和通信技术（ICT）分类。;文献综述研究了美国公司的法律和概念方面。从代理问题开始，研究了为高管人员的绩效而不是其职位而支付薪酬的复杂性。首席执行官和董事会在确定首席执行官薪酬时应公平交易的问题受到质疑。董事，环环相扣和相互联系的董事会以及根深蒂固的董事会结构的独立性可能给首席执行官提供比董事会更大的议价能力，与最佳独立交易议价过程相比，这增加了他们的相对报酬。最近因看似首席执行官薪酬过高而引起的公众愤慨。分析了在公众眼中隐藏大量薪酬的方式，然后分析了构建薪酬合同以激励CEO履行公司利益的不同方式。公司以首席执行官报酬作为因变量的回报。有两个研究假设：（1）过多的首席执行官薪酬导致公司业绩不佳； （2）董事会薄弱导致首席执行官薪酬更高。研究发现，CEO薪酬变动对市值的依赖性最大，其次是公司的股本回报率和资产回报率。当公司经历正股本收益率时，发现股本收益率与CEO薪酬之间具有更强的正向关系。公司回报的另一项衡量标准是“股东总回报”，对薪酬的影响很小。研究还发现，除非公司经历正的股本回报率，否则兼任董事长的首席执行官不太可能获得更高的报酬。建议使用本文的发现对未来首席执行官进行“过多”的CEO薪酬衡量。

著录项

  • 作者

    Popescu, Radu.;

  • 作者单位

    University of Colorado at Boulder.;

  • 授予单位 University of Colorado at Boulder.;
  • 学科 Economics General.
  • 学位 M.S.
  • 年度 2006
  • 页码 107 p.
  • 总页数 107
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

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