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Scheler's phenomenological ontology of value: Implications & reflections for ethical theory.

机译：舍勒的价值现象学本体论：对道德理论的启示和思考。

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摘要

My dissertation provides the first comprehensive account of what values are in Max Scheler's Formalism in Ethics (Formalism hereafter). As a phenomenologist, Scheler did not attempt to invent a new ontological language to describe value experience clearly as Heidegger invented for his fundamental ontology of Dasein. In so doing, Scheler's phenomenological descriptions often use metaphysically rich language and in so doing, Scheler generates ambiguity surrounding what he most sought to make clear, value. To remedy this confusion, I argue that Scheler's concept of Aktsein can supply an ontological understanding of value given the dearth of a clear ontological explanation of value in his phenomenological period culminating in the Formalism. This inquiry is divided into three chapters.;In Chapter 1, I explain the central concepts in his phenomenology of value at root in the Formalism. I both explain and reveal the central ambiguities in the Formalism. For the most part, Chapter 1 is expository and develops an interpretation of the central ambiguities in Scheler's phenomenology of value.;In Chapter 2, I problematize these central ambiguities and take note of when and where phenomenology collapses into ontology. This transition can best be made clear in his Idealismus und Realismus essays where Scheler explicates the structure of being-in-an-act at the very moment he "ontologizes" phenomenology. In addition to that moment in this work, I make analogies to Heidegger's phenomenology as a way into ontology. By making specific analogies to being-in-an-act and being-in-the-world, I show how the similar ontological tendencies in Heidegger provide us with a way to regard Scheler's Aktsein. In making this analogy, I do not reduce Scheler's phenomenological ontology to Heidegger, but instead put them into dialogue with each other revealing the solution of Scheler's ontology of value is realized in the act-intentionality of love. When I draw my conclusions both from the analysis of the Idealismus und Realismus essays and Heidegger, I label Scheler's ontological account of value: participatory realism.;In Chapter 3, participatory realism is, then, put into contact with philosophers from the emotivist tradition. I define the emotivist tradition to include a noncognitivist interpretation of David Hume, A. J. Ayer and C. L. Stevenson. While I could have been content to seek out a solution to this ambiguity in Scheler's work and conclude the merits of my interpretation, I am a firm believer in Scheler's position as a solution to the problem of value ontology. As such, participatory realism's uniqueness and merit are better served by putting it into contact with another decided alternative. Given that the analytic tradition had supplied emotivism as a view that connects the emotions with value-experience, it seemed only fitting that Scheler could call into question a dominant answer to value ontology and further clarify the resources Scheler brings to bear on the problem itself.
机译：本文首先对马克斯舍勒的形式主义伦理学（以下简称形式主义）中的价值观进行了全面的论述。作为现象学家，舍勒没有尝试发明一种新的本体论语言来清晰地描述价值体验，就像海德格尔为他的本世本体的基本本体发明的那样。这样，舍勒的现象学描述经常使用形而上学丰富的语言，因此舍勒在他最想清楚地表达的东西周围产生了歧义。为了弥补这种混乱，我认为，鉴于舍勒在现象主义时期到形式主义的高潮时期，对价值的清晰本体论解释的缺乏，它可以提供对价值的本体论理解。本研究分为三章。在第一章中，我解释了他的形式主义根源价值现象学中的中心概念。我既解释又揭示了形式主义的中心歧义。在大多数情况下，第1章是说明性的，对舍勒（Scheler）价值现象学的中心歧义作出了解释。在第2章中，我对这些中心歧义进行了质疑，并注意到现象学何时何地陷入本体论。这种转变可以在他的理想主义和现实主义论文中清楚地表明，舍勒在他“本体论”现象学的那一刻就阐明了行动中的结构。除了该工作的那一刻，我将海德格尔的现象学作为类推论的一种方式进行类比。通过对行动中和在世界中进行特定的类比，我展示了海德格尔中类似的本体论倾向如何为我们提供了一种对待舍勒的阿克塞辛的方式。在进行类比时，我不会将舍勒的现象学本体论简化为海德格尔，而是将它们彼此对话，以揭示舍勒勒的价值本体论的解决方案是在爱的行为意图中实现的。当我通过对理想主义和现实主义论文以及海德格尔的分析得出结论时，我将舍勒的价值论本体论标记为：参与式现实主义。在第三章中，然后将参与式现实主义与来自情感主义传统的哲学家联系起来。我定义了情感传统，包括对大卫·休ume，A·J·艾耶和史蒂文森的非认知主义解释。尽管我本可以满足于寻求解决舍勒的歧义并得出我的解释的优点，但我坚定地相信舍勒作为价值本体论问题的解决方案的地位。因此，参与式现实主义的独特性和优点可以通过与另一种确定的替代方案进行接触而得到更好的服务。鉴于分析传统提供了一种将情感与价值体验联系起来的观点，因此，舍勒可以质疑价值本体论的主要答案，并进一步澄清舍勒带给问题本身的资源似乎很合适。

著录项

  • 作者

    Hackett, J. Edward.;

  • 作者单位

    Southern Illinois University at Carbondale.;

  • 授予单位 Southern Illinois University at Carbondale.;
  • 学科 Philosophy.;Ethics.;Religion Philosophy of.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2013
  • 页码 221 p.
  • 总页数 221
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

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