• 主题
高级搜索  >
历史搜索 清空历史
首页> 外文学位 >Cause and consequence: Electoral volatility in the modern democractic polity.
【24h】

Cause and consequence: Electoral volatility in the modern democractic polity.

机译：原因和后果：现代民主政治中的选举动荡。

获取原文
获取原文并翻译 | 示例
页面导航
  • 摘要
  • 著录项
  • 相似文献
  • 相关主题

摘要

This dissertation investigates the causes and consequences of a core value of democracy: the ability of citizens to change the balance of power amongst the political parties that represent them—a phenomenon known as electoral volatility. I first study causes, arguing that citizens support parties that successfully implement important policies during their time in office and reject those that do not. I advance previous work by testing the argument that institutions channel the sort of change that may occur. I argue that institutions act to moderate the prospects of opposition parties at election time, presenting two aspects of change: shifts in support for existing experienced parties and emerging support for new parties. I find, among other results, that mixed electoral systems provide opportunities for new parties that other systems impede.;In the next analyses, I examine the effects of existing and new forms of electoral volatility on delays in bargaining over cabinet positions after elections. I contend that delays are conditioned by two factors: uncertainty regarding the preferences of potential government parties for certain posts and the complexity of rule sets and contextual situations. I advance a counter-intuitive argument: experienced parties should know the rules and their partners--hence complexity should not be a problem. Yet as these experienced parties seek to maximize the number of posts they hold, concessions should be difficult to achieve—thus formations should take longer. On the other hand, new parties should be inexperienced and should hold known preferences for particular cabinet posts. Veteran bargaining partners are likely to exploit this, satisfying new partners with less than they might cede otherwise and forming governments faster. My results, derived from quantitative analysis and field work in the state of Israel, support these arguments.;Finally, I examine the effects of both electoral volatility and government formation delays on a critical source of income for modern democracies: the purchase of domestic businesses by foreign firms—a practice known as foreign direct investment (FDI). I test the argument that democratic political phenomena often considered abhorrent (such as volatile elections and lengthy government formations) can serve to attract investors by keeping governments and lawmakers out of the way. Among other interesting results, I find that new party volatility and legislative polarization can serve to increase FDI rather than reduce it.;This dissertation provides important contributions to the understanding of democratic politics in several ways. First, it helps to explain why established parties succeed and why new parties emerge within democracies. Second, it advances the study of government formations by allowing for nuanced view of cabinet negotiations following elections. Finally, my work provides insights for scholars of both comparative politics and political economy as it connects democratic politics to an important tangible consequence: inflows of foreign direct investment.
机译：本文研究了民主核心价值的原因和后果：公民改变代表民主的政党之间权力平衡的能力-这种现象被称为选举动荡。我首先研究原因，认为公民支持在上任期间成功实施重要政策的政党，而拒绝不这样做的政党。我通过检验有关机构引导可能发生的变化的论点来推进先前的工作。我认为，机构在选举时会采取行动来缓和反对党的前景，这体现了两个方面的变化：对现有经验丰富的政党的支持转移和对新政党的新兴支持。我发现，除其他结果外，混合选举制度为其他政党阻碍的新政党提供了机会。在接下来的分析中，我考察了现有和新形式的选举波动对选举后内阁职位议价延误的影响。我认为，延迟是由两个因素造成的：潜在政府方对某些职位的偏好不确定，规则集和情境的复杂性。我提出了一种违反直觉的论点：经验丰富的各方应该了解规则及其伙伴，因此复杂性不应该成为问题。然而，随着这些经验丰富的政党寻求最大程度地增加其所拥有的职位数量，应该很难实现让步，因此组建需要更长的时间。另一方面，新的政党应该没有经验，应该对特定的内阁职位保持已知的偏好。经验丰富的谈判伙伴很可能会利用这一点，以较少的代价满足新伙伴的要求，并更快地组建政府。我的研究结果来自以色列国的定量分析和实地考察，支持了这些论点。最后，我考察了选举动荡和政府成立延迟对现代民主国家的重要收入来源的影响：购买国内企业外国公司的做法-一种称为外国直接投资（FDI）的做法。我检验了这样一种论点，即通常被视为令人讨厌的民主政治现象（例如动荡的选举和冗长的政府组成）可以通过使政府和立法者远离公众来吸引投资者。在其他有趣的结果中，我发现新的政党动荡和立法两极化可以起到增加而不是减少外国直接投资的作用。;本论文从几个方面为理解民主政治提供了重要的贡献。首先，它有助于解释建立的政党为什么成功以及为什么新政党在民主国家内部出现。其次，它允许对选举后的内阁谈判有细微的了解，从而推进了政府机构的研究。最后，我的工作为比较政治学和政治经济学的学者提供了见解，因为它将民主政治与重要的实际结果联系在一起：外国直接投资的流入。

著录项

  • 作者

    Martin, James R., Jr.;

  • 作者单位

    The Florida State University.;

  • 授予单位 The Florida State University.;
  • 学科 Political Science General.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2013
  • 页码 172 p.
  • 总页数 172
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

相似文献

  • 外文文献
  • 中文文献
  • 专利
获取原文

客服邮箱：kefu@zhangqiaokeyan.com

京公网安备：11010802029741号 ICP备案号：京ICP备15016152号-6 六维联合信息科技 (北京) 有限公司©版权所有

  • 客服微信

  • 服务号