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Essays on Elite Persistence, Accountability, and Representation.

机译：关于精英的坚持，问责制和代表性的论文。

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摘要

This dissertation consists of three empirical chapters on elite persistence, accountability, and representation.;The first chapter examines the determinants of dynastic politicians in democracies. In the chapter I introduce a theoretical framework where parties face a trade-off between nominating strong but undisciplined dynastic politicians, or loyal but weak non-dynastic candidates. Under this framework, I predict that parties rely on dynasts only in districts where their organizations are weak. I test this prediction in the context of Victorian Britain, and show results broadly consistent with the theory. The main findings in the chapter suggest that party strength is key to explain the variation in the incidence of dynasties across time and countries.;In the second chapter, I examine how partisan alignment between politicians (co-partisanship) affects bureaucratic performance and policy outcomes. The chapter introduces a theory where only co-partisan legislators can credibly threaten to punish bureaucrats. I predict that co-partisan legislators are more likely to sponsor, and bureaucrats to approve, projects associated with higher rents. I also predict that legislators, anticipating a favorable disposition from bureaucrats, use more resources during periods of partisan alignment. I provide evidence supporting these predictions based on a unique dataset of works implemented under India's Member of Parliament Local Development Scheme.;Finally, in the third chapter, co-authored with Scott Abramson, we estimate the impact of personal power on stability and institutional development in autocracies. Following the literature of dynasties in democracies, we propose a leader's tenure as proxy for his political capital. We then exploit the random timing of natural deaths for a set of European monarchs, and show their successors were deposed less frequently and less likely to face parliamentary constraints. We also show that the effect of tenure on successor deposal is at least as large as the one associated with succession orders -- an institution that has received recent attention in the literature. Our results are consistent with a theoretical account we develop wherein leaders accumulate political power the longer they are in office which then determines patterns of succession, stability, and institutional development in autocracies.
机译：本文共分为三章，分别是关于精英的坚持，问责制和代表性的实证研究。第一章考察了民主国家朝代政治人物的决定因素。在本章中，我介绍了一个理论框架，其中当事方在提名强大但不受纪律的王朝政治家或忠诚但虚弱的非王朝候选人之间进行权衡。在这种框架下，我预测政党仅在组织薄弱的地区依靠政体。我在维多利亚时代的英国背景下测试了这一预测，并证明了结果与理论基本一致。本章的主要发现表明，政党实力是解释朝代在不同时间和国家间发生率变化的关键。在第二章中，我研究了政客之间的党派一致（共党派）如何影响官僚的绩效和政策结果。本章介绍了一种理论，其中只有跨党派的立法者才能可信地威胁要惩罚官僚。我预计，共党议员将更有可能赞助和官僚批准与较高租金相关的项目。我还预测，立法者会期望官僚派遣一个有利的人选，因此在党派团结期间会使用更多资源。我根据印度国会议员地方发展计划实施的独特工作数据集提供了支持这些预测的证据。最后，在第三章中，由斯科特·艾布拉姆森（Scott Abramson）合着，我们估计了个人权力对稳定和体制发展的影响专制。根据民主国家朝代的文献，我们提出领导人的任期，作为其政治资本的代理。然后，我们利用一组欧洲君主的自然死亡的随机时间，证明他们的继任者被罢免的频率降低，也不太可能面临议会的限制。我们还表明，保有权对继任者撤职的影响至少与与继任命令相关的影响一样大-该机构最近在文献中受到关注。我们的结果与我们提出的理论解释是一致的，在该理论中，领导者在任职的时间越长，其积累的政治权力就决定了独裁者的继任，稳定和制度发展的模式。

著录项

  • 作者

    Velasco Rivera, Carlos Javier.;

  • 作者单位

    Princeton University.;

  • 授予单位 Princeton University.;
  • 学科 Political science.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2016
  • 页码 166 p.
  • 总页数 166
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

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