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Essays on political economy of environmental policy: Technology choice, political instability and democracy.

机译：关于环境政策的政治经济学的论文：技术选择，政治不稳定和民主。

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摘要

This dissertation consists of three essays that examine the effects of various governmental attributes on environmental policy and technology.; The first essay seeks to explain the implications of corruption and political instability on the firm's abatement technology investment. We employ a model where a monopoly firm has an incentive to under-invest in abatement technology in order to gain an advantage in the political process determining environmental policy. We investigate whether greater corruptibility can lead to an increase the level of abatement technology investment. In addition, we examine whether political instability can raise abatement technology investment. Using steel-sector panel data from 49 countries for the years 1992--1998, we try to find empirical evidence for the effect of corruption and political instability on technology choice.; The second essay seeks to explain the implications of democracy and political instability on the level of environmental policy stringency. The interaction between the two variables plays a vital role that has been ignored in the literature. We find that greater policymaker instability leads to a decrease in environmental policy, where the level of democracy is sufficiently high. However, political instability increases environmental policy, where the level of democracy is relatively low. Using cross-country data for the late 1990's, we find empirical support for these predictions. We determine that stable democracies set relatively more stringent environmental polices. This is a novel finding in the literature.; The third essay takes a deeper look at the positive effect of democracy on environmental policy stringency. Using the method of propensity score matching, we show that this result is largely driven by parliamentary democracies, as opposed to presidential-congressional systems. Presidential-congressional systems do appear to have higher gasoline taxes than dictatorships, but other environmental policy measures are largely equivalent to those set by dictatorships. Electoral rules (proportional and majoritarian systems) make little difference, on the other hand. This is a novel finding in the literature.
机译：本文由三篇论文组成，分别考察了政府各种属性对环境政策和技术的影响。第一篇文章试图解释腐败和政治动荡对企业减排技术投资的影响。我们采用的模型是，垄断企业有动机对减排技术进行投资不足，以便在确定环境政策的政治过程中获得优势。我们调查更大的腐败性是否会导致减排技术投资水平的提高。此外，我们研究了政治动荡是否可以增加减排技术投资。我们使用1992--1998年来自49个国家/地区的钢铁行业面板数据，试图找到腐败和政治不稳定对技术选择的影响的经验证据。第二篇文章试图解释民主和政治不稳定对环境政策严格程度的影响。这两个变量之间的相互作用起着至关重要的作用，在文献中已被忽略。我们发现，更大的决策者动荡会导致环境政策的减少，因为那里的民主水平足够高。但是，政治不稳定增加了民主程度相对较低的环境政策。使用1990年代后期的跨国数据，我们发现了这些预测的经验支持。我们确定稳定的民主国家设置了相对更严格的环境政策。这是文献中的一个新颖发现。第三篇文章更深入地探讨了民主对环境政策严格性的积极影响。使用倾向得分匹配的方法，我们表明，这一结果在很大程度上是由议会民主制驱动的，而不是总统-国会制。总统制国会的汽油税确实比独裁政权高，但是其他环境政策措施在很大程度上与独裁政权相同。另一方面，选举规则（比例制和多数制）没有什么区别。这是文学上的一个新颖发现。

著录项

  • 作者

    Wollscheid, James Robert.;

  • 作者单位

    Southern Methodist University.;

  • 授予单位 Southern Methodist University.;
  • 学科 Economics General.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2005
  • 页码 160 p.
  • 总页数 160
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类 经济学;
  • 关键词

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