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The exit of venture capital and financial disclosure in newly-public firms.

机译：新上市公司退出风险投资和财务披露。

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摘要

This study addresses the relation between the exit of venture capital and opportunistic behavior in financial disclosure. Specifically, I examine whether the exit of venture capital is associated with income-increasing earnings management in the IPO year and financial statement restatements related to the period prior to the exit of venture capital. After controlling for the endogenous choice of exit, I document that Consistent with earnings management, the exit of venture capital is significantly positively related to performance-matched discretionary accruals in the IPO year. Regardless of VCs' exiting, VCs' stockholdings prior to the expiration of lockup period are negatively related to discretionary accruals in the IPO year. Surprisingly, VCs' representation on the audit committee has no significant relation with income-increasing earnings management.; Restatements are less likely to happen prior to or during the period of VCs' exit, and more likely to happen after VCs exiting. My results support this hypothesis. More importantly, the exit of venture capital has a significant impact on the relation between VCs' stockholdings and the probability of announcing a restatement prior to VCs' exiting. Only for firms with VCs' exiting, does VC representation on the audit committee have a significantly negative association with the probability of announcing a restatement prior to VCs' exiting. Neither VCs' holdings nor VCs' representation on the audit committee has a significant relation with the probability of announcing a restatement after the exit of venture capital.; The associations I find are robust to usage of different instruments for the exit of venture capital, different measure for discretionary accruals, the inclusion of control variables for the intended use of proceeds and auditor's characteristics, and CEO's incentives to manage earnings.; Finally, my results indicate that as firms without VCs exiting, firms with VCs exiting have similar abnormal stock returns during the lockup period and for the period from the lockup expiration through the record date of the first proxy available thereafter. The exit of venture capital is associated with less likelihood of securities class action after the IPO. In addition, I find some evidence that income-increasing earnings management imposes some costs for venture capitalists, e.g., fewer new IPOs and greater underpricing for new IPOs.
机译：本研究探讨了风险投资退出与财务披露中的机会主义行为之间的关系。具体来说，我研究了风险投资退出与IPO年度的增收收益管理以及与风险投资退出之前的时期相关的财务报表重述是否相关。在控制了退出的内生选择之后，我证明与收益管理一致，风险资本的退出与IPO年度与业绩匹配的可自由支配应计金额呈显着正相关。不管风险投资公司退出了什么，在锁定期届满之前，风险投资公司的股票持有量与IPO年度的可自由支配权产生负相关。令人惊讶的是，风险投资人在审计委员会中的代表与增加收入的收益管理没有重大关系。重述不太可能在VC退出之前或期间发生，而更有可能在VC退出之后发生。我的结果支持这一假设。更重要的是，风险投资的退出对风险投资人的持股量与退出风险投资人宣布重述的可能性之间的关系具有重大影响。仅对于退出风险投资的公司，审计委员会中的风险投资代表与退出风险投资之前宣布重述的可能性之间存在显着负相关。风险投资人的持股量或风险投资人在审计委员会中的代表与风险投资退出后宣布重述的可能性均无显着关系。我发现这些协会对于使用各种用于退出风险投资的工具，对可自由支配应计费用的不同衡量方法，针对收益的预期用途和审计师特征的控制变量，以及首席执行官管理收益的激励措施，都具有较强的鲁棒性。最后，我的结果表明，随着没有退出风险投资的公司退出，退出风险投资的公司在锁定期间以及从锁定期满到其后的第一个代理人的记录日期这段时间内，股票收益都有相似的异常。风险资本的退出与首次公开募股后进行证券集体诉讼的可能性较小。此外，我发现一些证据表明，增加收入的收益管理会给风险投资家带来一些成本，例如，新发行的新股数量减少，新发行的新股定价偏低。

著录项

  • 作者

    Luo, Wei.;

  • 作者单位

    University of Pittsburgh.;

  • 授予单位 University of Pittsburgh.;
  • 学科 Business Administration Accounting.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2005
  • 页码 147 p.
  • 总页数 147
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类 财务管理、经济核算;
  • 关键词

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