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Three Essays on Private Landowners' Response to Incentives for Carbon Sequestration through Forest Management and Afforestation.

机译：关于私人土地所有者通过森林管理和植树造林对固碳奖励措施的回应的三篇论文。

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摘要

This dissertation consists of three essays on private landowners' response to incentives for carbon sequestration in forests. The first essay examines private landowner response to incentives for carbon sequestration through various combinations of intermediate management practices. The second essay focuses on agricultural landowners' willingness to participate in an incentive program for carbon sequestration through afforestation, and estimates the potential for carbon sequestration from afforestation, as well as its cost. The third study examines relative performances of incentive targeting strategies for forest carbon sequestration under asymmetric information given spatially heterogeneous land types.;The first essay uses an econometric approach to analyze the factors affecting non-industrial private forest landowners' choice of forest management practices, and examines how these choices might change in response to the use of incentives for carbon sequestration. I use estimated parameters to simulate the carbon sequestration potential for different combinations of management practices, and compare the effectiveness and costs of performance-based and practice-based incentive payment schemes in the Western U.S. The results suggest that incentive payments can increase the probability that desirable combinations of management practices are adopted, and particularly that incentives targeting increased fertilization yield the highest carbon sequestration potential. I also find that a performance-based payment scheme produces higher carbon sequestration than a practice-based payments scheme. However, the annual sequestration potential of intermediate forest management in response to incentive payment is not as large as the sequestration potential of afforestation.;The second essay uses a survey-based stated preference approach to predict landowners' willingness to participate in a tree planting program for carbon sequestration as a function of various factors affecting landowners' decision making and different levels of incentive payments. The estimation results show that the annual payment for carbon sequestration significantly and positively affects landowners' stated level of enrollment in a tree planting program. I use the estimated parameters to conduct regional level simulations of carbon sequestration in response to incentive payments. These simulations show that the carbon supply function in the Pacific Northwest region is steeper than in the Southeast region because of the lower adoption rate and less available lands. The national level carbon supply functions derived from this study are steeper than those obtained from bottom-up engineering approaches and optimization models, and are in the same range as those from revealed preference approach studies.;The third essay uses both a conceptual analysis and a numerical analysis to examine the relative performances of incentive programs for carbon sequestration using alternative targeting criteria in the presence of asymmetric information and heterogeneity in costs and benefits. The results show that in the presence of asymmetric information, the combination of high cost-high benefit variability and negative correlation, which is the combination that achieves the greatest benefit gains under perfect information, can result in the greatest benefit losses. Additionally, a comparison of two targeting schemes shows that if cost variability is greater than benefit variability with negative correlation, the benefit achieved under benefit-cost ratio targeting can be lower than that under acreage targeting, so that an optimal targeting strategy under perfect information may no longer be optimal under asymmetric information.
机译：本文由三篇关于私有土地所有者对森林固碳激励措施的回应组成。第一篇文章探讨了私有土地所有者通过各种中间管理实践组合对碳封存激励措施的反应。第二篇文章集中于农业土地所有者参与通过植树造林进行碳封存激励计划的意愿，并估算了植树造林造成的碳封存的潜力及其成本。第三项研究考察了在给定空间异质土地类型的情况下在非对称信息下森林碳汇激励目标策略的相对绩效。第一篇论文采用计量经济学方法分析了影响非工业私有林地主选择森林经营方式的因素，以及考察了这些选择如何因使用碳固存激励机制而改变。我使用估计的参数模拟了不同管理实践组合的碳固存潜力，并比较了美国西部基于绩效和基于实践的奖励支付计划的有效性和成本。结果表明，奖励支付可以增加可取碳的可能性。采取了多种管理措施的结合，特别是针对增加施肥的激励措施产生了最高的固碳潜力。我还发现，基于绩效的付款方案比基于实践的付款方案产生更高的碳固存。但是，由于奖励措施而导致的中间森林经营的年封存潜力没有造林的封存潜力大;第二篇论文使用基于调查的既定偏好方法来预测土地所有者参与植树计划的意愿碳封存的影响取决于影响土地所有者决策和各种奖励支付水平的各种因素。估算结果表明，每年的固碳费用显着且积极地影响了土地所有者规定的植树计划的入学水平。我使用估计的参数对激励付款进行碳封存的区域级模拟。这些模拟表明，由于采用率较低且可用土地较少，西北太平洋地区的碳供应功能比东南地区更陡。这项研究得出的国家层面的碳供应函数比自下而上的工程方法和优化模型得到的碳供应函数要陡峭，并且与揭示的偏好方法研究的范围相同。数值分析，以在存在信息不对称以及成本和收益异质性的情况下，使用替代目标标准来检验碳封存激励计划的相对绩效。结果表明，在信息不对称的情况下，高成本-高收益可变性和负相关性的组合，即在完美信息下获得最大收益的组合，可能导致最大的收益损失。此外，两种目标方案的比较表明，如果成本变异性大于具有负相关性的收益变异性，则收益成本比目标制下的收益可能会低于种植面积目标下的收益，因此，在完美信息下的最佳目标化策略可能在非对称信息下不再是最优的。

著录项

  • 作者

    Kim, Taeyoung.;

  • 作者单位

    Oregon State University.;

  • 授予单位 Oregon State University.;
  • 学科 Climate Change.;Economics Environmental.;Agriculture Forestry and Wildlife.;Land Use Planning.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2012
  • 页码 180 p.
  • 总页数 180
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

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