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首页> 外文学位 >A game-theoretic study of the threat to commercial aviation from man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS) using a geometric model.
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A game-theoretic study of the threat to commercial aviation from man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS) using a geometric model.

机译：基于几何模型的便携式防空系统（MANPADS）对商业航空威胁的博弈论研究。

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摘要

Concerns about the threat of surface-to-air missiles to aircraft were originally limited to military applications, but the asymmetrical nature of some conflicts (e.g., non-state actors at war with nation states) in the post-Cold War era has introduced this threat to commercial aviation. The relatively wide availability of MANPADS in the global arms market also contributes to the threat. Unfortunately, due to the differences between military and civilian environments, the strategies used to manage this threat in a military environment are not easily applicable to commercial aviation. Thus, assessing the risk of MANPADS to commercial aviation requires a fresh look at an old problem.;At the heart of this problem is estimating the probability that a missile launched from a MANPADS in the vicinity of an airport will hit an airplane taking off or landing at the airport. The model we developed to address this question incorporates parameters reflecting the size and effectiveness of the secure region around the airport, the effectiveness of the MANPADS, the trajectory of the aircraft, the attacker-location strategy, and the effectiveness of the MANPADS countermeasures installed on the aircraft (if any).;We then formalized the contest between the attacker and the defender as a two-person dynamic game and our analysis identified three quantities affecting the resulting subgame-perfect equilibrium: (1) the ratio of the cost of countermeasures to the expected loss from a successful MANPADS attack (cost-loss ratio); (2) the protective benefit gained from the countermeasures investment (as measured by the reduction in hit probability); and (3) the hit probability that could be achieved by the attacker using weapons other than IR MANPADS.;The results indicate that investment in countermeasures is not predicted if the cost is too high. Investment in countermeasures is predicted if the cost is sufficiently small, as long as other weapons are not sufficiently effective to cause the attacker to switch strategies. In between these two extremes, the model also allows for mixed solutions, with countermeasures being implemented on only a fraction of the aircraft fleet, and the attacker choosing at random between MANPADS and other weapons when they are equally effective.
机译：对地对空导弹对飞机的威胁的担忧最初仅限于军事应用，但是在冷战后时代，某些冲突（例如与民族国家交战的非国家行为者）的不对称性质导致了这种情况。对民用航空的威胁。 MANPADS在全球武器市场上相对广泛的可用性也加剧了这一威胁。不幸的是，由于军事环境和民用环境之间的差异，用于在军事环境中管理这种威胁的策略并不容易应用于商业航空。因此，评估MANPADS对民用航空的风险需要重新审视一个旧问题。该问题的核心是估计从MANPADS在机场附近发射的导弹撞击飞机起飞或降落的机率。在机场降落。我们为解决此问题而开发的模型包含了反映机场周围安全区域的大小和有效性，MANPADS的有效性，飞机的轨迹，攻击者的定位策略以及安装在该系统上的MANPADS对策的有效性的参数然后，我们将攻击者和防御者之间的竞赛正式化为两人动态博弈，我们的分析确定了三个影响最终博弈完美平衡的因素：（1）对策成本的比率成功的MANPADS攻击造成的预期损失（成本损失比）； （2）从对策投资中获得的保护性利益（通过降低命中率来衡量）； （3）攻击者使用IR MANPADS以外的武器可以达到的命中率。结果表明，如果成本太高，则无法预测对策的投资。如果成本足够小，只要其他武器的效力不足以使攻击者转换策略，则可以预测对策的投资。在这两种极端之间，该模型还允许混合解决方案，仅在部分机队中实施对策，而攻击者在同样有效的情况下在MANPADS和其他武器之间随机选择。

著录项

  • 作者

    Okpara, Uche.;

  • 作者单位

    The University of Wisconsin - Madison.;

  • 授予单位 The University of Wisconsin - Madison.;
  • 学科 Engineering Industrial.;Computer Science.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2012
  • 页码 112 p.
  • 总页数 112
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

  • 入库时间 2022-08-17 11:42:47

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