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Mainstreaming the Radical Right.

机译：将激进权利主流化。

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摘要

Radical right parties are on the rise. The once despised pariahs of the political world now emerge as policy makers in governing coalitions across Europe: from the volatile democracies of Eastern Europe to the well-established Nordic welfare states. Despite an impressive collection of theoretical and empirical studies explaining the rise of the radical right, this literature has largely overlooked the variation in government participation of these parties. This leaves several important questions unanswered: why do well established mainstream parties accept radical right parties that often promote extreme anti-liberal and anti-democratic platforms as coalition partners in some countries but not in others? how long do the coalitions that contain radical right parties last? what kind of ministerial portfolios are the radical right parties allocated once the enter governing coalitions?;In my dissertation, I argue that the probability of radical right parties getting into government, securing cabinet portfolios and remaining part of the coalition, all depend on their ideological position on the economic dimension and is not hampered by their extremism on the socio-cultural dimension. The reason being that radical right parties place high importance on the socio-cultural dimension and low value on the economic dimension, which is orthogonal to dimension saliencies of mainstream parties. This allows radical right parties to be more flexible in finding compromise with the rest of the coalition partners. I show that while all radical right parties maintain extreme positions on the socio-cultural dimension, they display a great deal of variation on the economic dimension. While some espouse ultra-neoliberal economic programs, others champion protectionism, welfare chauvinism, and openly reject capitalism. Radical right parties that position themselves close to the rest of the coalition's ideal point on the economic dimension are able to oer its coalition partners valuable policy compromises.;I employ a multi-method approach that includes both large N analyses as well as case studies to test my theory in a series of three articles. In the first article, I test how the probability of the radical right parties entering cabinet depends on their ideological positioning on different dimensions. In the second article, I argue that radical right parties are often over-compensated with portfolios due to coalition stability considerations and lower costs of some portfolios. The lower costs are the direct result of dimension orthogonality and party position's on the economic dimension. Finally, in the third article, I extend my argument to show that the distance on the economic dimension between the formateur and the radical right party is an important factor that affects durability of such coalitions: the smaller the distance, the longer the coalition is likely to survive. I also find that coalitions containing a radical right party with a moderate economic platform are not any more volatile than the more traditional coalitions that only consist of mainstream parties.;This work contributes to the literature on radical right parties that is predominantly focused on explaining why these parties succeed or fail on the electoral arena but does not address what happens after radical right parties get elected. In addition, I make a contribution to the broader coalition literature by proposing a more nuanced view for the role of ideology in coalition politics.
机译：激进的权利方正在增加。曾经被鄙视的政治世界的贱民如今作为决策者来管理整个欧洲的联盟：从东欧动荡的民主国家到成熟的北欧福利国家。尽管有大量令人印象深刻的理论和实证研究解释了激进权利的兴起，但这些文献在很大程度上忽略了这些政党在政府参与方面的变化。这就留下了几个重要的问题未得到回答：为什么建立良好的主流政党接受激进的右翼政党，这些激进的右翼政党经常在某些国家作为联盟伙伴而提倡极端的反自由和反民主平台，但在另一些国家却不这样做？包含激进右翼政党的联盟能维持多久？激进右翼政党一旦进入执政联盟，将会分配什么样的部长级职务？；在我的论文中，我认为激进右翼政党进入政府，确保内阁大权和其余联盟成员的可能性全都取决于其意识形态。在经济方面的地位，不受其在社会文化方面极端主义的束缚。原因是激进的右翼政党在社会文化层面上高度重视，而在经济方面则价值较低，这与主流政党的维度重要性是正交的。这使激进的权利方可以更灵活地与其他联盟伙伴寻求妥协。我表明，尽管所有激进的右翼当事方在社会文化方面都保持极端立场，但它们在经济方面却表现出很大的差异。虽然有些人拥护极度自由的经济计划，但另一些人则拥护贸易保护主义，福利沙文主义并公开反对资本主义。激进的右翼政党将自己置于联盟在经济层面上的其他理想点附近，能够为联盟伙伴提供宝贵的政策妥协。我采用了一种多方法的方法，其中包括大量的N分析以及案例研究，通过三篇文章来检验我的理论。在第一篇文章中，我测试了激进右派进入内阁的可能性如何取决于他们在不同维度上的意识形态定位。在第二篇文章中，我认为，由于联盟稳定的考虑和某些投资组合的成本较低，激进的右翼当事方通常会对投资组合进行过度补偿。较低的成本是维度正交性和政党地位在经济维度上的直接结果。最后，在第三篇文章中，我扩展了论点，以表明格式制定者与激进右翼党派之间在经济维度上的距离是影响此类联盟持久性的重要因素：距离越小，联盟可能就越长生存。我还发现，包含具有适度经济平台的激进右翼政党的联盟比仅由主流政党组成的更传统的联盟没有更多的动荡性;这项工作对激进右翼政党的文献做出了贡献，该文献主要集中于解释为什么这些政党在选举舞台上是成功还是失败，但没有解决激进右翼政党当选后的后果。此外，我对意识形态在联盟政治中的作用提出了更为细微的看法，从而为更广泛的联盟文学做出了贡献。

著录项

  • 作者

    Schnose, Viktoryia.;

  • 作者单位

    Washington University in St. Louis.;

  • 授予单位 Washington University in St. Louis.;
  • 学科 Political science.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2016
  • 页码 133 p.
  • 总页数 133
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类
  • 关键词

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