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首页> 外文学位 >Goodbye or see you later: Why states fight some secessionists but not others.
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Goodbye or see you later: Why states fight some secessionists but not others.

机译：再见或以后再见：为什么国家要与某些分裂国家斗争，而不与其他分裂国家斗争。

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When faced with secessionists, states essentially respond in one of two ways: with negotiations, concessions and limited levels of violence, or with repression and large-scale violence. What explains this variation? I argue that governments respond more harshly if they perceive that the movement represents an external security threat, or a challenge from without.;My theory proposes two causal pathways to repression and large-scale violence: the external threat can be either direct and in the future, or indirect and in the present.;When an ethnic minority wins its own state, it attains capabilities that are unique to centralized states, such as the ability to raise a military or trade with allies, amongst others. If it secedes, the minority gains these capabilities and is thus more able to hurt the host state's security. In this situation, a host state forecasts into the future to gauge how the ethnic group might use its new-found capabilities. If the host state believes that the ethnic group will challenge its security after independence, it would want to nip the threat in the bud, and respond with repression and violence.;The host state may also perceive that the secessionists are part of an alliance with an external rival. In this situation, the movement is seen by the state as part of an external conflict, and its followers as fifth columnists. The central conflict is between the host state and a global or regional rival; the ethnic minority is a participant on the side of the rival, or at least perceived as such, for reasons ranging from realpolitik to ethnic affinity. Under these circumstances, a demand or declaration of independence by the ethnic group can be perceived as the handiwork of the rival abroad, the idea being that the rival is seeking to weaken the host state from within.;I use controlled comparisons of historical case studies of secessionist movements to test my theory. I examine the Pakistani responses in Bengal and Balochistan in the 1970s, variation across time in the Ottoman treatment of Armenian nationalists under the Young Turk regime, and the differing levels of violence in India's treatment of ethno-nationalists in Assam, Punjab, and Kashmir. I also briefly consider whether the external security argument can explain two completely peaceful secessions – Norway-Sweden and Czechoslovakia.
机译：当面对分裂主义者时，国家基本上以以下两种方式之一作出回应：谈判，让步和有限程度的暴力，或者镇压和大规模暴力。是什么解释了这种变化？我认为，如果各国政府认为该运动是外部安全威胁还是来自外部的威胁，则应对会更加严厉;我的理论提出了压制和大规模暴力的两种因果途径：外部威胁既可以是直接威胁，也可以是大规模威胁。当少数民族赢得自己的国家时，它将获得集中国家所独有的能力，例如增兵或与盟国交易的能力。如果脱离，少数派将获得这些能力，因此更有能力损害东道国的安全。在这种情况下，东道国将对未来进行预测，以评估该种族群体如何利用其新发现的能力。如果东道国认为该族群将在独立后挑战其安全，它将希望将威胁遏制在萌芽状态，并以镇压和暴力应对。东道国也可能会认为分裂国家是与外部竞争对手。在这种情况下，该运动被国家视为外部冲突的一部分，其追随者被视为第五专栏作家。中心冲突是东道国与全球或区域竞争对手之间的冲突。少数民族是竞争对手一方的参与者，或者至少是这样认为的，其原因包括从现实政治到种族亲缘关系。在这种情况下，种族群体的要求或宣布独立可被视为国外竞争对手的手脚，其思想是竞争对手正在试图从内部弱化东道国。分裂主义运动来检验我的理论。我考察了1970年代巴基斯坦在孟加拉和Bal路支省的反应，奥斯曼在年轻土耳其人政权下对亚美尼亚民族主义者的待遇随时间的变化以及印度对阿萨姆邦，旁遮普邦和克什米尔邦的民族主义者的暴力程度的不同。我还简要考虑一下外部安全论点是否可以解释两个完全和平的分裂国家：挪威-瑞典和捷克斯洛伐克。

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  • 作者

    Butt, Ahsan Ishaq.;

  • 作者单位

    The University of Chicago.;

  • 授予单位 The University of Chicago.;
  • 学科 Political Science International Relations.
  • 学位 Ph.D.
  • 年度 2012
  • 页码 302 p.
  • 总页数 302
  • 原文格式 PDF
  • 正文语种 eng
  • 中图分类 宗教;
  • 关键词

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